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Contents

1  The Chinese Massacres of 1866
   **ELMER RUSCO**

31  An Interesting Feature of the New Government’s
    Difficulties: Public Printing in the Western Territories
    **ROBERT D. ARMSTRONG**

Book Reviews

    reviewed by Joseph A. Fry

    reviewed by Robert Alan Goldberg

    reviewed by Andrew B. Russell

**Front Cover:** Illustration *(Nevada Historical Society)*


66  *Buildings of Nevada.* By Julie Nicoletta (Oxford University Press, 2000) reviewed by José L. Gamez


70  *Chinese on the American Frontier.* Edited by Arif Dirlik (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001) reviewed by Diana L. Ahmad
The Chinese Massacres of 1866

ELMER RUSCO

In June 1866 several Nevada newspapers printed stories reporting one or more massacres of Chinese on their way to mines in Idaho or Montana. On June 2 the Humboldt Register reported that “a drove of Chinamen on their way to Montana was attacked, just over the line, in the Queen’s river country, and 40 are reported killed. Two white men accompanying them escaped back to Dun Glen, and report all the Chinamen but three killed.” This story was repeated verbatim five days later in the Territorial Enterprise. On June 7 and 8 the Gold Hill News and the Carson Daily Appeal reprinted this “special dispatch” from Chico, California: “A prospector, just in from the Humboldt road, states that a party of fifty Chinamen from Virginia City were attacked, near the Owyhee river, by about one hundred and fifty Indians, and forty-nine killed.”

Three different massacres of Chinese during a brief period in the spring of 1866 have been reported, although there is some confusion in these accounts. Liping Zhu, the author of a study of nineteenth-century Chinese participation in mining in the Boise Basin in Idaho, states that “at least twice during the nineteenth century, an entire group of Idaho-bound Chinese was wiped out by Indians on the trail,” but describes only one incident. Four other accounts briefly mention a Chinese massacre in this area at this time, without apparent awareness that there were others.

These massacres were significant events, particularly because of the large numbers of persons killed in them, a topic dealt with below. Yet no one has previously described them in detail. This account is based on a larger number of sources than any previous study of the question, but it is hoped that it will prompt further searches, chiefly in newspapers in California, Idaho, and

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Oregon, plus United States Army and Bureau of Indian Affairs records in the National Archives.

This addition to our knowledge about the 1866 massacres will begin with an account of Chinese travelers from California to mining booms taking place in Idaho and Montana, and describe a geographic barrier confronting the travelers. It will then organize available accounts of the massacres, in so far as this is now possible, deal with the question of survivors, and place the events described in the context of a wider violent conflict. It will conclude with speculation about who the perpetrators of the massacres may have been, make an estimate of the number of deaths involved, and end with comments about the fact that such important events have not been given greater attention before now.

**Chinese Mining in the American West**

The Chinese massacres of 1866 took the lives of parties—no doubt entirely or almost entirely made up of men—on their way to mining sites in either Idaho or Montana. The arrival of significant numbers of Chinese men in the American West, beginning in the 1850s, was triggered by the discovery of gold in California. For many years the lure of wealth through mining was a primary motivation for continued Chinese immigration to and within the West. Scholarly articles, by Randall Rone and by Liping Zhu, particularly emphasize the leading role in placer mining played by the Chinese during this era.³

The Chinese were just as interested in staking claims to rich mining sites as the EuroAmericans who also flocked to the West in the same period, but the Chinese were largely prevented by various discriminatory means from gaining more than a toehold in initial discoveries in most parts of the American West. After 1866, when the first federal mining law was enacted, they were almost completely excluded from filing mining claims on public lands by the interaction of this law with the 1790 federal statute establishing procedures for naturalization. The 1866 mining law allowed United States citizens or persons who had applied for citizenship to file mining claims, but the 1790 naturalization law denied the right to apply for citizenship to persons who were not both "free" and "white." However, the mining law did not prevent persons not considered "white" from purchasing mining claims. In fact, the placer mining engaged in by Chinese during this period depended chiefly on such purchases. Moreover, after the advent of underground—hard rock—mining, the Chinese were largely excluded from participating in this development not only by lack of capital but also by the hostility of white miners' unions.⁴

There is no doubt that the Chinese men who were victims of the 1866 massacres were part of a stream of Chinese moving from California, where they had entered the United States, toward mining booms in the Boise Basin of Idaho.
and southwestern Montana, although details of their destinations are not recoverable. Liping Zhu notes that a small number of Chinese had reached the Boise Basin by 1862 but that significant numbers did not arrive until the fall of 1865. At about the same time, another rush to Montana began. Gold was first discovered in southwestern Montana in 1858, and "a major gold rush" began in 1862.5

There were two major routes from central California toward the Boise Basin and, beyond it, to the Montana goldfields. The map shown in Figure 1 indicates roughly the location of the two major routes involved in this migration.6

A route from Chico, California, passed through the northwest corner of Nevada and then turned east to head straight for Ruby City, later Silver City, in Idaho Territory. Another route came through Nevada's Comstock, proceeding from there in a northeasterly direction along the Truckee and Humboldt rivers to Winnemucca, roughly paralleling present Interstate 80. One branch of this road then headed directly north, intersecting the Chico route at what was then called the Owyhee Crossing. A more direct route would have been to continue from Winnemucca in a northeasterly direction to the Boise Basin, but this was impossible because it would have required travelers to cross the canyons of the Owyhee River system.

Several branches of the Owyhee River originate in Nevada and Idaho but come together in Oregon a few miles west of the Oregon/Idaho border at a point (called Three Forks) about forty miles north of the Nevada border to
Figure 1: Routes to Silver City, 1866, from California and Nevada
form the main Owyhee River. The Owyhee flows basically north from this point on, eventually joining the Snake River beyond the Caldwell/Nampa area of Idaho.

This part of southeastern Oregon and southwestern Idaho is plateau country; ancient lava flows are cut through by steep canyons, a fact which made crossing streams very difficult—and still does. A practical way to cross the Owyhee canyon complex from either west or east does not exist before the Owyhee Crossing, about thirty-five miles north of the Three Forks confluence. At this point all travelers from the west or south were funneled over the Owyhee Crossing and then along the south side of the Jordan River to points further east.

At the time of the massacres the Owyhee Crossing consisted of a ford over the Owyhee, although effort was under way to bridge the crossing. A newspaper story in May 1866 reported that Major Louis Marshall had pledged at that time to “do all he [could] to protect the workmen while they bridge the Owyhee.”

In other words, whether travelers were headed from the west or southwest to the Boise Basin or beyond to Montana, in May or June 1866 they had to go through the Owyhee Crossing to bypass the canyon system. However, there was another possible route which bypassed the complex on the east. Beyond Winnemucca, it was then possible to continue in an eastern direction, winding along the Humboldt River, as Interstate 80 does today. Possibly at a point where the town of Elko was later built, this route could head directly north, basically along the alignment of present-day Nevada Route 225. Such a route, from a point not far south of the border with Idaho, would have followed a portion of the Owyhee River north through what became in 1877 the Duck Valley Indian Reservation, and then continued in a generally northwesterly direction to the Boise Basin. A variant of this means of bypassing the Owyhee canyon area on the east would have been to follow the Humboldt to Battle Mountain (which was founded some time during 1866) and then proceed northeast to intersect the route north from Elko just south of the present Duck Valley Reservation.

Nevada newspaper articles reported a number of Chinese parties passing through the Comstock toward the Boise Basin along one or more of the Nevada routes from 1865 through 1867. The first of these reports stated that “the large crowd of John Chinamen who have recently left this country for Boise and Idaho, have been driven back by the miners” of that area.

From this time on for two years, Comstock newspapers printed at least twelve stories about similar parties headed for either Idaho or Montana. Most of these reports were in April and May of 1866, which meshes with the conclusion by Liping Zhu that the Chinese population in the Boise Basin “exploded” in 1866, and that at the same time there was also a “stampede to Blackfoot, Montana.”

There is insufficient space here to record all the details provided by these stories, but several themes are apparent. First is the fact that reporters gave
both Idaho and Montana as destinations for the Chinese parties. Second, it was reported that sometimes the Chinese were planning to make the trips on foot, while hiring a white teamster to carry their "shovels, pans and other mining tools," plus blankets and provisions. In other cases, however, the Chinese were reported to have hired teamsters to transport them as well as their possessions.11

Twice these stories reported that a teamster hired to transport their goods had abandoned the Chinese before they had reached their destination. The second of these accounts states that

at Limerick, a few evenings ago, a teamster who was hauling a load of [Chinese traveling toward Montana] quarreled with one and shot him in the abdomen. He then unloaded the poor devils and their chattels, and turned back, leaving the Johns to prosecute their journey on foot. Of course, he had taken his pay in advance for the entire trip; and it does look as though he might have arranged that "misunderstanding" purposely to enhance the profits of his trip.12

Third, after the 1865 account of the Chinese being forced to retreat from the Boise Basin, there were no more reports of returns to the Comstock. The hostility of white miners in Idaho did not stop the Chinese from participating in the mining boom. While the Idaho legislature did pass discriminatory taxes directed at the Chinese in 1864 and 1866, Zhu has documented that the Chinese working at placer mining in that area improved their material status, in comparison with their situation before leaving China. He concluded that, in this area, "the Chinese achieved a decent standard of living."13

Among other things, their housing was improved and their diet was better, and their death rates in the new mining camp were low in comparison with EuroAmerican miners. Another sign of their satisfaction with the rewards of mining in this area was that after the decline in gold production in 1866, the percentage of Chinese who stayed on was greater than that of the EuroAmericans; in Boise County in 1870, the Chinese made up more than 45 percent of the total population.14

Not even the massacres stopped the migration to Idaho goldfields. On June 9, 1866, the Owyhee Avalanche, a Boise Basin newspaper, noted the arrival of about forty Chinese, who "came in wagons, on jackasses and on foot, passing on to Silver, whence they will 'speed' their way to Idaho City," and on June 23 it reported that "a large wagon load of Chinamen arrived on Sunday via Humboldt. They left Queen [Quinn] River on the 3d, and saw no Indians." Another story on the same day noted that "almost every abandoned claim or gulch in which the color of gold can be found has its gang of Chinamen at work. They take out many thousand [sic] dollars" from some of these claims.15

The migration of Chinese through Nevada to the goldfields continued into the year after the massacres. On May 23, 1867, the Territorial Enterprise printed a brief story to the effect that "a train of Chinese left this city yesterday for Idaho." The next day, it noted that "a train of 400 Chinese passed through Day-
ton yesterday on their way to Montana” and that “a rear guard of 350 more is still to come. Most of the Celestials were on foot, but their traps were being transported on wagons driven by white men.”

Dayton is in Gold Canyon, where Chinese engaged in placer mining as early as 1852; it was once named Chinatown.

How long it took the Chinese to reach their Idaho destination must have varied from several to many weeks, depending on whether all the parties were on foot. (A party which was mostly pedestrian would have had to proceed at a slow pace even if accompanied by a wagon or wagons.) In the first issue of the Owyhee Avalanche there is a report by one of the publishers—Joseph and Jonathan Wasson and J. L. Hardin—describing a two-week trip by stagecoach from Chico to Ruby City (later Silver City). But Liping Zhu reported that Chinese traveling from Sacramento to the Boise Basin required two or three months to make the trip between these locations.

Details of the massacres are difficult to establish and, for various reasons, some published details are probably inaccurate. Nevertheless, three massacres, at quite different locations on the routes described above have been reported. The massacre noted at the beginning of this article as reported by both the Humboldt Register and the Territorial Enterprise was said to have been “just over the line,” which must mean just north of the Nevada/Oregon boundary, on the branch of the Humboldt route north from Winnemucca. This location reportedly was “in the Queen’s river country.” This was an early name for what is now the Quinn River, which flows west and south from a point just below the Nevada border, eventually terminating in the northern portion of the Black Rock Desert.

The mention of Dun Glen in the following newspaper report is also indicative of the position. An 1885 article in the Winnemucca Silver State, although inaccurate in some respects, asserts that the massacred Chinese had been accompanied by two white men, teamsters, who were hauling their effects. The two white men escaped to Dun Glen, in this [Humboldt] county, and reported the massacre.” These facts establish that the site of this massacre was about forty miles south of the Owyhee Crossing, on the western side of the canyon complex.

Another massacre was reported near the Owyhee Crossing. The Chico Dispatch cited earlier refers to this location. On May 26 the Owyhee Avalanche reported “another wholesale Indian slaughter [of Chinese]... west of the Owyhee just above the mouth of Jordan Creek.” Jordan Creek joins the Owyhee just north of the Crossing. A listing of violent episodes in eastern Oregon between 1865 and 1867 apparently refers to this event. The superintendent of Indian
affairs in Oregon reported that around May 19, 1866, “50 Chinamen were wending their way across the desolate region separating California from Idaho, when they were attacked by Snake Indians and 49 of them were killed and horribly mutilated. Only one escaped to give a report of the massacre.”

An account of this massacre, though probably somewhat inaccurate, was printed in 1881; it, too, identified the Owyhee Crossing as the location. The *Winnemucca Silver State* published a story about the death in that town of a Chinese man who had lived in Winnemucca since 1875. Cue Long was said to be “the only Chinaman who made his escape from the wholesale slaughter in 1865 [sic] on the Owyhee.” The article said that a group of “some eighty” Chinese was killed in this incident and that Cue Long was “the owner of this band, having brought them direct from Hong Kong to put in the gold mines of Idaho.”

The article also gave a dramatic account of Cue Long’s escape, claiming that being very fleet of foot, [he] took to the sage-brush and had a run for life for five miles on the open plains, pursued by a score of yelping Piutes. As he reached the banks of the Owyhee, a stalwart buck overtook and seized him. In the desperate struggle which ensued, both were precipitated headlong down into the deep and swift current. The Indian disappeared; the Chinaman swam to the opposite shore and made good his escape to the “Sheep Ranch.”

Details of this account may be doubtful, but the reference to "open plains," the fact that he could fall into the river without jumping off a cliff, and the mention of the Sheep Ranch, located on the south side of Jordan Creek not far east of the Crossing, all confirm that the report refers to the Crossing massacre. (This story asserted that Cue Long had become an opium addict and that “for some reason [had] lost his caste [sic] among his countrymen.” The story contains some misinformation (such as the year of the massacre and the assertion that Cue Long had been a member of the “royal family” in China. There was an imperial family at this time, but no reason at all to assume that one of its members came to this country).

A third location is reported in two oral histories collected by the Bancroft History Company’s researchers many years later. Both state that the site for one of the massacres was on or near Battle Creek, a tributary of the Owyhee River on its eastern side, not far north of the Oregon/Idaho border.

In 1879 J. S. Butler said that the

Chinese began to come into the [Boise] basin in 66-7. Two bands aggregating some 150, and several White-men were overtaken by Winnemucca’s band in Iv’e’s Canon near Battle Creek and ruthlessly slaughtered . . . No quarter was shown . . . The Indians scalped the Chinese easily and expressed great satisfaction at the ease in which the act was accomplished and Chinese scalps were considered a choice article . . . on account of the tails.
This sounds as though Mr. Butler was an eyewitness or quoting one, but his oral history does not establish how he knew about the event.21

The oral history of F. R. Starr, recorded by Bancroft researchers in 1883, apparently is not a record of Mr. Starr’s own observations, for one thing because he did not come to Idaho until 1872. He said that “300 chinamen [sic] and 2 white men, on their way to Idaho,” were camped in Battle Creek canyon when they were attacked and killed by “hostile Piutes.” Mr. Starr said that “I was told that the chinese [sic] appeared to give themselves up entirely to slaughter, as they were found scattered along a distance of 200 yards, with their throats cut, no sings [sic] showing that they made resistance.” He also said that “the soldiers dug a large grave 12 feet square and quite deep, into which the bodies were thrown and it is to be seen plainly defined by the mat of wild rose bushes that grow in the sunken spot.” He stated that “the white men are buried a few yards away, and were found killed at some distance from the Chinese.”22

Mr. Butler gave a slightly different version of the mass grave in the Battle Creek area. He said that “the Chinese in Idaho sent out men and buried [the corpses] in a large grave 12 feet square to be seen now about 10 feet from the roadside grown up in a mat of wild rose bushes.”

The account of the Owyhee Crossing massacre published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs also refers to mass burial of the Chinese; it stated that “Lieutenant Pessoon [Silas Pepoon], with his command of Oregon cavalry, dashed to the spot and found the dead bodies spread along the road for six miles . . . . The bodies were buried and the Indians pursued, but not overtaken.”23 These accounts make it easier to explain the report, noted below, that in at least one case the bodies were exhumed by Chinese six years later.

Apparently there were no eyewitnesses to any of the massacres, other than the murderers and survivors. The attacks must have aimed at the total murder of both parties, and there is no reason to believe that the Chinese had any arms with which they might have attempted defense.

SURVIVORS

The report that a man named Cue Long was a survivor of one of the attacks has been noted. Mike Hanley and Ellis Lucia assert of one of the massacres that “only one [Chinese man] escaped death when he hid under some driftwood along the river bank.” However, Cue Long was not identified as this person. Hanley and Lucia wrote that “I-John [sic] lived for many years in Silver City.”24 The Bancroft 1879 oral history given by J. S. Butler says that “only one China boy escaped. He came to Hill’s ferry on Snake River and W. P. Hill kept him for several years.”
AFTERMATH OF THE MASSACRE

A report published "in the fall of 1867" in several California newspapers provides confirmation that there was scalping of at least some of the victims. Written by Joseph Wassom, a part-owner of the Owyhee Avalanche in 1866, this story stated that "scouts [accompanying troops at the battle of Infernal Caverns] remained around the place [after the battle] till dark, but nothing new developed except that 'Boise Jimmy' found the corpse of a chief that was at the head of stealing H Co's horses last winter. The 'boys' have got the fur cap taken off [an] unnamed Chinese and the scalp it covered."25

Two weeks after its initial June 1866 reports, the Virginia City Territorial Enterprise printed a follow-up noting another death as an apparent consequence of one of the massacres. The death in that city of a Chinese woman named Yow Choy was reported; she was found dead in her bed. Because "no sign of external violence was visible on examination by Dr. Bryanly," the coroner could identify no cause of death. However, the newspaper continued, "her husband was murdered by the Indians, near Owyhee, some time ago, an account of which we published at the time." The Enterprise article of June 7 had reported one of the massacres. Because Yow Choy had been depressed since the murder and had access to opium, "it [was] generally supposed she committed suicide by taking an overdose of opium."26

The bones of some of the victims were dug up and shipped back to China six years later. In October 1872 the Territorial Enterprise reported that the Humboldt Register had just carried a story to the effect that "two wagon loads of Chinese bones were brought to [Winnemucca] to be shipped to San Francisco, from whence they will be taken to the Flowery Kingdom. They were mostly the bones of Chinese who were scalped by the Indians about two years ago [sic] in the country north of us. They came into town with Chinese flags flying, and after their bones arrived at Chinatown the whole population of that portion of the town turned out" to conduct some kind of ceremony.27

The Chinese in the American West at that time did usually return the bones of Chinese who had died in the United States to the villages from which they had come for proper burial, but presumably this would have been difficult to do with remains from common graves.

MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE MASSACRES

There is a contemporary military account of a response to one of the massacres, but neither this nor any other military source yet found contains information on the massacres themselves. A published report by Major General Frederick Steele, commanding the Department of the Columbia, a part of the United States Army's Division of the Pacific, records a battle between troops...
commanded by Major Louis H. Marshall of the 14th Infantry Regiment and an unidentified group of Indians in the Owyhee canyon area. A detailed account of this battle, written by Major Marshall, is presented below. However, General Steele’s report on this conflict says nothing about Chinese massacres.²⁸

Major Marshall was a graduate of West Point, in the class of 1845. He served in several infantry units before and during the Civil War, and on March 13, 1865 was made a brevet lieutenant colonel “for gallant and meritorious service during the war.”²⁹

The wider military context of this battle is dealt with below, but here it is necessary to explain Major Marshall’s involvement. The major “was sent from Fort Vancouver to take command of the district of Boise” on March 2, 1866. On May 11 he had led “84 men on a scout up the Owyhee river.”³⁰ It was during this expedition that he heard of at least one Chinese massacre and pursued Indians he believed responsible for it.

On June 4, 1866, the day he returned to Fort Boise, Major Marshall wrote to Captain W. L. Lanban of the Department of the Columbia at Fort Vancouver in Washington Territory, reporting the battle. He said that he had been encamped on the Jordan River with thirty-five men from two companies of troops since May 11, and that his force had been augmented by forty-nine other soldiers when he learned of one of the massacres. Marshall did not give details, but wrote that, on or after May 24, the troops under his command “struck the trail of the Indians who had, the day before, murdered a large party of Chinese.”³¹

The rest of Major Marshall’s letter deals with the ensuing battle. He wrote that he “overtook the Indians, numbering about 500 women and children included,” on May 27. His account of the military engagement is dramatic and is quoted in full. The Indians, he said,

were strongly posted on the east bank of the south fork of the Owyhee River we being on the west bank. The River, at this point, runs through a canon nearly a mile deep, the water can be reached only at very few points, and at these points by Indian trails that are very difficult. As soon as I came in sight they drove their stock up the middle fork of the Owyhee, and, before we could reach the river, they had their warriors, between three and four hundred, posted high above us, behind ledges of rock, which rendered them perfectly safe or nearly so from our fire. Four of them remained outside, one, the chief, giving his directions. These were instantly shot two of them killed—one being the chief—and two badly wounded. The river is very deep and rapid, and I deemed it inexpedient to cross my men as I would expose them to the fire of 200 rifles. We fought them for 4 hours, killing 7 and badly wounding 12, five shells were thrown over the point of the mountain, and burst in midst of their camp,—with what effect, I know not, we could see them pack their dead and wounded over the hills and bring fresh men to take their places. I had no men nor horse hurt. Having fought for 4 hours I withdrew my men to the top of the bluff intending to make an effort to cross the river below the forks, and get in their rear, this plan I put into execution on the night of the 28th, but as bad luck would have it, my boat sank before I had crossed half my men. I could not ascend the bluff that night, but had to wait until morning to make another boat, my men and stores were all crossed in safety. I then sent my scouts up the bluff. As Corpl. William Philips Co. B 1st Oregon Cav. in
charge of the scout got near the top, he was killed and his body taken by the Indians. He was an excellent soldier, and is a great loss to the service in this district. The next man to him was shot at by a hundred Indians, his horse was killed but he got to Camp safe. The whole force of Indians showed themselves on the bank and shot at us for several hours, until it became too dark to see. The country is so difficult that only one man at a time can climb these Indian trails. Ten men can hold a hundred in check and prevent their ascent. At night I deemed it best to get back on the west side for fear I might be hemmed in, — which I did in safety. When my boat sank my gun sank with it, but I shall be there before the water runs out, and shall get it.\textsuperscript{32}

From this account, Major Marshall attacked the Indians at the Three Forks area, south of the Owyhee Crossing and west of Battle Creek. The rugged terrain in this area, combined with the fact that the Indians undoubtedly were more familiar with it than the soldiers, explains most of the outcome of the battle. (The claim that the canyon was a mile deep is an exaggeration; a depth of 300 to 400 feet is more accurate).

The\textit{ Avalanche} printed a version of the battle which is in basic agreement with Marshall’s official report, based on an interview with the major. The newspaper account stated that the Indians were “five hundred strong,” that there were “at least two hundred and fifty armed warriors,” and that they “had about one thousand head of good horses which were driven up the middle fork of Owyhee.” This story also cites the major as the source for the claim that “Indians kept up a continuous fire with rifles — not an arrow was shot.”\textsuperscript{33} The major must have exaggerated the size of the party which he attacked, but the Bancroft\textit{ History of Oregon} is mistaken in implying that he had reported a “force” of five-hundred “to account for the defeat.” His letter at one point referred to two-hundred rifles; the five-hundred figure included women and children.\textsuperscript{34}

The\textit{ Avalanche} stated that Major Marshall would “go after them continually, if he can’t wipe them out this Summer, will go after them in the Winter and keep doing so till the job is completed.” However, it later claimed that he did not act aggressively after this encounter, although it asserted that one of his officers wanted to pursue the Indian party immediately. By June 23 the\textit{ Avalanche} was sarcastically reporting that Marshall was “spending a few quiet days [elsewhere] in Idaho” because “it is dangerous over this way and great captains should not imprudently expose themselves.”\textsuperscript{35} The 1866 report of the War Department states that Major Marshall left with three cavalry companies on July 16 “for the Bruneau river” and that on August 4 he left with this force “from the mouth of the Bruneau . . . on a scout to Goose Creek mountains” which eventually took him to Camps C. F. Smith and Warner, Steen’s Mountain, and Harney Lake. Routes through one of these places include the Owyhee canyon complex. No report of the outcome of these moves had been made by October, but Major Marshall informed General Steele “verbally that, while scouting on the south fork of the Owyhee, his command [had] killed 35 Indians.” The Bruneau River is east of the Owyhee canyon complex; it flows into the Snake River.\textsuperscript{36}
The defeat of Major Marshall’s troops in the Three Forks battle plus this officer’s perceived reluctance to take vigorous action led to efforts to organize a local group of volunteers to attack the Indians, in spite of the failure of an earlier volunteer assault on the Indians. A group of about a hundred volunteers were organized under the leadership of Isaac Jennings and set off to assault the Indians. Reportedly they refused to allow men from the local Chinese community to join them; an article in the Avalanche reported that “the Chinamen found out what was going on and ‘Charley’ wanted to equip and send thirty of his countrymen, but they were not accepted. They are, however, willing to aid all they can and have furnished thirty to forty good horses.”

Major Marshall was opposed to these volunteer efforts but was unable to persuade the group to be more prudent. Jennings led a group of fifty men in an intended assault on the Indians, but the volunteers never were able to defeat the Indians. Instead, they found themselves trapped by Indians in a box canyon. The group of volunteers had to be rescued three weeks later by the army.

The 1866 report of the War Department reported these events as follows: “Soon after [the 23rd of June] the Indians corralled some citizens in the Owyhee mining district, and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel John J. Coppinger, fourteenth infantry, moved with his company . . . from Fort Boise by forced marches to their assistance . . . The Indians got wind of the troops and left before their arrival.”

To this point, the Indians had been successful in a military sense.

Major Marshall was relieved of his command later in 1866. The War Department’s report for 1867-68 states that on November 5, 1866, Marshall was commanding “the district of Owyhee” but that by December the commander of the Boise District was General George Crook, who arrived in Boise City on December 11, 1866. Shortly after Crook’s arrival, on January 29, 1867, the Boise District was discontinued, replaced by the District of Owyhee, which included the forts that had been part of the Boise District plus Camps McDermitt and Winfield Scott, both in Nevada. Major Marshall resigned from the army on November 23, 1868.

**THE WIDER MILITARY CONTEXT**

Examination of the wider military context of these events makes it clear that they occurred during a spasm of violence between Native Americans and EuroAmericans at a stage of western history during which the conquest of native American territory in this part of the country was taking place. The period of violence began in December, 1865, as far as the army was concerned; the general in charge of the Department of the Columbia reported in October 1866 that “nothing is known at these headquarters of any operations in the field in this department during the previous year” before December. It lasted until 1868, when the last Indian groups involved in the conflict surrendered.
area affected consisted of parts of southwestern Idaho, southern Oregon, northeastern California, and northern Nevada. No reports of actual battles in Nevada were found, but it was alleged that Indian groups from northern Nevada were active outside Nevada’s borders. The army general with over-all responsibility for the military efforts in this area described it as consisting of an “immense extent of country, including the headwaters of the Snake, Owyhee, Little Humboldt, and Quin [sic] Rivers, and the tributaries of Malheur, Harney, Warner, and Surprise Valley lakes.” The anthropologists Julian Steward and Erminie Voegelin described events over a longer period of time in this area as a time of “predatory bands” in the Great Basin; they call this particular episode the “so-called Shoshoni War of 1865-8” in Oregon. The Bancroft History of Oregon also refers to “The Shoshone War” during this period.

An insightful discussion of the basic cause of this period of violence was provided at the time by Major General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Division of the Pacific, who then had over-all military authority in the area. General Halleck, a West Point graduate, was noted for his intellectual contributions; he was reportedly the “author of several works on mining law and international law, and translator of French works,” and the author of a widely read book on military strategy, published in 1846.

As General Halleck saw it, his antagonists were “mostly Pah-Utes, Shoshones, Snakes, Bannacks, and independent bands or fragments of other tribes.” He then explained, in the same passage, the conditions that had led to violence.

It is evident, from the character and nomadic habits of these Indians, that to obtain the means of subsistence they must range over a very large extent of country, where they can get supplies of fish, wild fowl, game, nuts, grass seed, roots, etc.

The rapid advance of white settlements into Nevada, Idaho, and eastern Oregon, has greatly limited the sources of these supplies, and the Indians, both the friendly and hostile bands, are often reduced to the verge of starvation. All the good lands in the valleys and on the borders of the lakes and streams being taken up by farmers, they can no longer gather grass seed, catch fish, or kill wild fowl in the places where they formerly obtained a large portion of their food. Our hunters have driven most of the deer and other wild animals from the mountains. Mines are opened in the ravines, and mills established for crushing and reducing the ores. For constructing houses, fences, sluices, bridges, tunnels, mills, etc., a large amount of timber and fuel is required, in a country where there are but few trees, and these only in small and distant patches. By the occupation or spoliation of these woodlands, the Indians are deprived of the oak groves and clusters of nut-bearing pines which formerly supplied a considerable part of their food, and almost their only means of subsistence now are fish and the few rabbits, quails, and small birds and grasshoppers, which they can find upon the barren sage-brush plains and deserts. And even here, when met by parties of travellers or emigrants, they are pretty certain to be shot down without notice or inquiry as to their friendly or hostile character.

Hence these Indians are almost forced into collisions and hostilities with the whites, and from their shiftless habits in regard to subsistence, they have scarcely any other alternative than to rob or starve. The frequent robberies and murders committed by these savages, and the retaliatory measures of the settlers, have inaugurated a war of extermination in portions of that country which will be ended only with the removal or entire destruction of the Indians.
Commissioned and non-commissioned officers in front of barracks at Fort McDermitt, Nevada. (Nevada Historical Society)
In the same War Department report, General U. S. Grant, who was then both secretary of war and commanding general of the United States Army, endorsed this view, remarking of the Indians in this area that, "as their hunting grounds are gradually taken from them by the settlers, they are obliged either to rob or starve." In other words, the situation was one in which EuroAmerican advances, made by private persons operating under federal land policies which led them to believe that taking possession of Native American lands was legal and desirable, provoked a violent Native American response, which the army was called in to suppress in the interests of the settlers.

The role of local EuroAmerican settlers in bringing in the army after Indian attacks is substantiated by the reaction of the *Avalanche* to Major Marshall's attack on an Indian party, noted above. It is also apparent in other articles in that newspaper calling for suppression of Native Americans. While no editorial expressing sympathy for the Chinese could be found in the weeks after the massacres, the *Avalanche* printed several vigorous condemnations of attacks by Indians on EuroAmericans, accompanied by demands that the army suppress them.

For example, the week after the report of the second massacre, the paper printed an editorial on "Savageness" which asserted that

no man can travel in any direction from this place without apprehensions of being robbed or murdered — perhaps tortured in no less agony than real crucifixion. Under these circumstances it can only be termed human to adopt and practice the most effective and deadly measures to rid the earth of the feared robbers, assassins and torturers. . . . What are the lives of a few thousand buck Indians — or even squaws and pappooses [sic] — to the prosperity of a great nation and the safety of those hardy pioneers who delve and open up its hidden wealth? Comparatively nothing.

This editorial went on to state that ordinary citizens "feel perfectly justified in killing 'nomadic' Indians on sight, because if they are not, in some thieving, murderous act, they are only waiting an opportunity." The editorial commended a so-called Humboldt war of 1865 in which, allegedly, four-hundred Indians were killed "in a few months." It even proposed that Indians should be used as "pilots to the savages' homes" and that the army should "force them to perform this service or shoot them on the spot."48

Two weeks later the *Avalanche* pressed on: Its editorial asserted that "the authorities must understand that to secure protection to our citizens and possession of this region the Indians must be subdued, and to do this they must be punished by overwhelming numbers. The task to be performed is equal to their extermination—whether that extremity is or is not a necessity."49

Of course, these viewpoints plus the strength and professionalism of the United States Army ultimately inflicted far heavier casualties on the Native Americans than those suffered by the EuroAmericans. Oregon's Superintendent of Indian affairs, J. H. Perit Huntington, compiled a "Statement of Indian depredations and of conflicts between Indians and troops and Indians and
citizens” in eastern Oregon, covering the period from September 1, 1865, to August 10, 1867, and it was published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. While this report probably is imperfect (and could be extended into 1868), its over-all picture is probably accurate. Native Americans during this period attacked EuroAmerican property in many incidents, and in many others stole livestock, but killings were few in comparison with the Indian deaths during the period of greatest conflict. Huntington’s report lists thirty-one “citizens” killed in these attacks, plus nine soldiers. Huntington’s data on Indian deaths cannot be tabulated precisely (in six cases he speaks of “a number” or “several” deaths and in two cases it is impossible to tell whether one figure is included within another). However, he lists more than 478 Indian deaths. This total includes all the specific figures and the lower number in the two cases cited above, to which should be added the 6 cases where multiple deaths are reported nonspecifically. In other words, there were more than twelve times as many Indian as EuroAmerican deaths.
Although there is a long history of appropriation of native American lands by EuroAmerican settlers—in a wider context, conquest—warfare of this sort in the latter half of the nineteenth century was not endemic. Instead, such violent conflict was confined both geographically and in time. For example, most of the area which had become the state of Nevada in 1864 did not experience any extended period of Indian-white warfare. Two scholarly summaries of warfare between the United States Army and Native Americans from the Civil War to the 1890s do not mention Nevada incidents.  

The Boise District was under the supervision of the Department of the Columbia, which in turn was part of the Pacific Division of the United States Army, commanded during this period by General Halleck. As was the custom, the army established a number of small military camps—most of them temporary—in the area mentioned above. In the 1867-68 report of the War Department, these were listed as Fort Boise, Camp Lyon, Camp Winthrop (or Three-Forks-of-the-Owyhee), Camp McDermitt, Camp Winfield Scott, Camp McGarry, Camp C. F. Smith, Camp Warner, Camp Bidwell, and Camp Harney.  

With the takeover of this effort by General Crook at the end of 1866, an extensive and continuous attack on Indians throughout the area finally brought military victory for the army. The climactic battle of this turbulent period occurred in the Pit River valley of Modoc County, California. Known as the Battle of Infernal Caverns, it featured army units under the command of General Crook against a force identified as “Paiute, Pit, Modoc, and Snake” Indians. General Crook’s successful strategy involved relentless pursuit of Indian forces made possible by increased mobility of the army units—achieved by replacing supply trains made up of wagons with mule trains—combined with the tactic of mounting military operations during the winter.  

The Indians involved in the Battle of the Infernal Caverns were well protected by a maze of volcanic rocks, which they knew well; in this respect the struggle resembles both Marshall’s Three Forks battle and the more famous, long-lasting battle between “Captain Jack’s” forces and the army in the lava beds of northern California several years later, in 1872.  

Presumably several factors help explain this temporally and geographically localized period of violence within the general history of the taking of Native American lands and resources. The level of violence may have reached high proportions in this time and place in part because the Native Americans involved were well supplied with horses. Demitri Shimkin has noted that while “by 1830 horses and horsemanship had spread in the [Great] Basin to all ecologically possible areas,” the country involved in this period of warfare was particularly well suited to extensive use of horses. He points out that “the broad zone between the Bear River and Klamath Lake to the west are shrub and grassland areas of moderate bearing capacity for grazing herds” and that, for this reason, “the advent of the horse led to equestrian societies engaged in long-distance hunting migrations, trade, and warfare.” In areas of the Great Basin
Chief Numaga of the Paiute. (Nevada Historical Society)
south of this, conditions for extensive use of horses were less favorable, which may well have been an important factor in explaining why armed native American resistance was more difficult in these areas.

The Native Americans who pursued effective warfare against the United States Army were well armed with rifles and not short of ammunition, as the battle between the forces led by Major Marshall and whatever group he was attacking makes clear. Since the guns and ammunition had to have come from EuroAmerican sources, another twist in this story is the question of how and when these weapons came into Native American hands.

If the Chinese were killed by Native Americans, we do not know why they were attacked with such extreme violence—a level of violence which has not been reported as directed against EuroAmericans in this area at this time. There are no corresponding reports of massacres of EuroAmericans of this magnitude.

Some of this may be due to the fact that troops accompanied some of the EuroAmerican parties using the Humboldt route. The *Avalanche* on May 5, 1866, reprinted a military order issued by Lieutenant C. T. Sherwood at Fort Churchill, a Nevada fort constructed east of Carson City in response to the Pyramid Lake War of 1860. The order stated that “Commanding officers of posts in northern Nevada will furnish such escorts as may be necessary for the safety of trains of four (4) or more wagons, passing over the routes from California and Nevada to Idaho and the Owyhee mines.” It went on to say that there were not enough troops in the area to extend protection to “isolated and straggling teams.”58 The *Humboldt Register*’s story of the incident near the Nevada/Oregon border reported that “while the Indians are aware that a goodly force of fighting soldiers is near by, the road to Idaho will be safe for small parties—and unsafe under any other policy.”59

Even EuroAmerican parties too small to be entitled to such protection did not meet wholesale massacres, however, and sometimes there were no deaths even if they were attacked. For example, on June 9, 1866, the *Avalanche* reported that a visitor to the newspaper office had met thirteen men walking toward Idaho City. “They told him that at the station west of the Owyhee the Indians captured all their stock and outfit, consisting of two wagons and twenty-one animals. The red thieves did not attempt to kill any of the party.”60

It is unlikely that the Chinese victims who were killed in large numbers had much to steal or that theft was a motivation for the assaults. The special dispatch from Chico mentioned earlier says that “the Indians also stole several trains of horses and mules. They stole a drove of sixty head of cattle, and killed and dried the meat in sight of the fort.” This is highly unlikely, since there are no reports that Chinese travelers had a significant amount of livestock, and there was no fort near the Owyhee Crossing.

The first account in the *Avalanche* of another massacre reported that the bodies of the Chinese “were mutilated in the most shocking manner. They had
thirteen horses and a full complement of mining tools—the former were all taken, and of the latter, the picks were stuck through the bodies and heads of the victims. Were [sic] mostly scalped and cut in sickening style."61 J. S. Butler’s account of the Battle Creek massacre states that the Chinese “had large quantities of Chinese stores and provisions which the Indians scattered among the brush and $300 was found in a rice sack at the scene of the tragedy.”

An aspect of the situation which cannot be examined here is the role of the treaty-making process in accounting for this particular outbreak of violence. Some of these Indians were reported to be Shoshones (which could have meant either Northern or Western Shoshones, although the information on this topic is inadequate). In 1863 a series of treaties was negotiated and ratified with all the various groups of Shoshone Indians, primarily as a way of ensuring peace in the vast area inhabited by these peoples. There were also other treaties between the United States and other Native American societies with a similar intent.62

Why these efforts did not prevent this very violent episode has not yet been investigated. A related topic is the creation of reservations for Indians, as places which could serve as sanctuaries for Indians expelled from most of their lands. However, few reservations had been created within the area involved in heavy fighting by the middle 1860s. The Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho, established for Northern Shoshones and Bannocks, came into existence in 1867.63

Another puzzle is why the massacres stopped so quickly. It is startling that the three incidents took place within a very limited period. Reports of later massacres on a similar scale have not been found, even though warfare in the area continued into 1868. Perhaps this means that the perpetrators formed a small group who were unique in harboring hostility toward the Chinese and who were put out of action soon after their murderous assaults. However, no evidence for this possibility has been discovered.

WHO WERE THE PERPETRATORS?

Another topic which needs to be discussed is the question of the identification of the perpetrators of these terrible events. Because the attacks occurred during an episode of violent conflict with native Americans and because all the contemporary accounts assume the perpetrators were Indians, probably some of them did attack the Chinese. But this is not certain, and there is no firm evidence identifying a specific Indian group or groups.

Major Marshall assumed that the murders were committed by Indians and that he had discovered the responsible group. However, his letter gives no explanation of how he came to this conclusion, nor did he attempt to identify the perpetrators specifically. His attack on the group he had identified as the murderers did not result in the surrender of those Indians; capture might have
resulted in their clearcut identification as the perpetrators (if they were in fact responsible).

The fact that the Indians he attacked included a significant proportion of women and children raises a question: Would such a group have carried out a mass murder? In the case of the Battle of Infernal Caverns, a similar composition of the native American group attacked by the army also raises doubt. In that instance, ethnographic evidence suggests that the Native Americans were members of several tribes who had come together for social purposes and found themselves attacked by the army.\(^64\)

Later accounts identified the murderers as “Piutes” or members of specific Northern Paiute bands. Hanley and Lucia, although they cite no sources, say that the Indians were a Northern Paiute band led by Egan, a leader of a Paiute band although he had originally been a member of the Cayuse tribe. Egan has been mentioned as a leader of a Northern Paiute band in this area at the time; later he was a principal war leader in the 1878 Bannock War.\(^65\) Butler in 1879, as reported above, identified the Indians as Winnemucca’s band of Northern Paiutes, again without citing any evidence. This assertion seems highly unlikely; Winnemucca’s band consistently avoided violence against settlers or the army.\(^66\)

A complicating factor is that none of the contemporary designations for major groups of Native Americans in this period of warfare is adequate to identify the groups specifically. For example, the term Snake was applied to several groups; most of these were probably Shoshones, but there is no way to link the use of this term to names for Native American groups in use today.\(^67\)

The 1863 treaties with the various elements of the Shoshone nation—noted above—provide us with descriptions of the territory believed by the Indian Agent James Duane Doty to have been occupied by various groups. But the evidence on which the negotiations leading to these treaties was based does not seem to be available, and no one, to my knowledge, has put all the treaties together to make a consistent picture in terms of contemporary geographic and Indian terminology.

This is an important point because the perpetrators could have been Euro-Americans, or have included EuroAmericans associated with Native Americans. The brief reference to lynchings of more than a hundred Chinese in Idaho in 1866 and 1867 by F. Ross Peterson notes that: “Naturally, these lynchings were usually blamed on the Indians.”\(^68\) Similar Indian/white collaboration or attempts to blame Indians for white atrocities are known in the American West in this period. The Mountain Meadows Massacre in Utah in 1857, in which around 120 EuroAmericans were killed, is one such case, although at a different time and under different circumstances. Brigham Madsen has reported the “proliferation of outlaw gangs composed of white desperadoes” who “sought at every opportunity to throw the blame for their attacks on neighboring Shoshoni and Northern Paiute” during the 1850s.\(^69\) A situation in which
there was for a while a high incidence of obviously uncontrollable violence might have encouraged additional violence among some members of the EuroAmerican community.

The presence of white allies of Indian predatory bands was reported in the Owyhee area by Hanley and Lucia, although they do not give a source. They wrote about what they described as the first expedition against Indians in the Owyhee country after the establishment of the Boise District. Troops led by Second Lieutenant Charles Hobart pursued Indians suspected of stealing livestock into a “steep rocky canyon.” After an indecisive battle, the army withdrew. Hanley and Lucia quote Lieutenant Hobart’s writing:

I think white men must have been among them, . . . for they told us in good English to “Come on you sons of bitches we can whip you anywhere.” They had considerable soldier’s clothing among them and appeared to have plenty of arms and ammunition. I am of the opinion that some of the Boise Indians were among them as the gun captured is one of those that was stored in the Quartermaster’s storehouse at Fort Boise. The warning was spread that any white man caught with the Indians would be shot.²⁷⁰

This account is unconfirmed but consistent with an article in the Avalanche on May 5, 1866, asserting that a Captain Collins “returned from his Squaw Creek scout last week unable to find any Indians anywhere in the vicinity. Maj. Marshall at once ordered him to go out again and ‘scout the country bordering on Burnt River and Clark’s Creek. Should he find white men among the Indians he will dispose of them as directed in previous orders.’”²⁷¹

The same incident is referred to in the Bancroft Oregon history, where it is stated that Captain Collins had been instructed that if he found “white men . . . in league” with Indians, they “were to be hanged without further ceremony.” Hanley and Lucia also report that Major Marshall, after “trouble with renegade whites grew more serious . . . ordered no sympathy be shown for renegade whites in league with the Indians—that they be hanged on the spot.” However, neither of these sources gives a primary source for these stories. The Bureau of Indian Affairs report of various conflicts between Indians and the army between 1865 and 1867 makes note of a battle on July 20, 1866, between “citizen volunteers” and eighty “warriors,” in which the Indians were accompanied by “a white man, named Burns,” who had been seen with the Indians previously and “no doubt [had] returned to warn the Indians and have them in readiness.” The same report also noted with reference to an Indian assault on a ranch on December 16, 1867, that “one of their party spoke English, and was thought to be a Frenchman.”²⁷²
CONCLUSION

Establishing the total death toll in these massacres is difficult. The various reports quoted above give numbers for particular massacres ranging from fifty to three-hundred, but apparently there is only one summary estimate, and it refers to only two massacres. As noted above, there is much confusion about the various incidents, including a reference by Peterson to a massacre or massacres in 1867; I have not yet found evidence for a massacre that late, although a Bureau of Indian Affairs report stated that in July, 1867, "Indians (supposed to be Rogue River Indians absent from Coast reservation without leave)" had "robbed Chinamen mining in southern Oregon, and attempted to sell their gold dust at a trading post nearby." However, apparently none of the Chinese was killed during this incident. The Owyhee Avalanche gave Major Marshall as the source for the statement that in early June, 1866, "ninety-five Chinamen were killed by the Indians last week—forty-five in one and fifty in another party. Of one hundred, only five Celestials escaped to tell the sad tale of their comrades' butchery." No details were given in this story about either incident, nor does it refer to a third massacre. Perhaps the major's report occurred before the third incident.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs report of the Owyhee Crossing massacre, after noting that the victims of that event had been buried, stated that "many other Chinamen must have been similarly murdered, as travellers coming over the road afterwards report finding 102 unburied bodies of Chinese lying exposed along the route." If roughly half this total of 102 is assumed to refer to the other incident reported by Major Marshall, around 50 other deaths plus some unknown number for the Battle Creek massacre need to be added to Marshall's total of 95. The 1881 newspaper story quoted above, long after the event, gives a total of around 80 for the Battle Creek massacre; it is not certain that it should be assumed to be accurate, however.

Even a total of 95 deaths makes this series of massacres the bloodiest of the incidents affecting the Chinese in the American West during the nineteenth and earliest twentieth centuries, and the actual over-all count in these massacres may well exceed the currently accepted total of deaths in all attacks on the Chinese in this time and place. John R. Wunder's excellent pioneer study of this question reports a total of 143 "Chinese Murdered" in the West from 1852 to 1908, but his report does not include any of the massacres described in this paper. At least two of the 1866 massacres exceeded the number of victims reported in the literature for any other individual event. The largest number of Chinese victims in a single incident other than the Owyhee massacres appears to be an assault in Oregon in 1887 which took thirty-one lives, followed by the Rock Springs, Wyoming, massacre of September, 1885, during which twenty-one persons were killed. Roger Daniels edited a collection of articles about similar
violence against the Chinese in the United States during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. His book discusses, in addition to the Rock Springs massacre, a Los Angeles anti-Chinese riot in 1871 which took the lives of nineteen Chinese. Considerably smaller numbers were killed in an 1880 riot in Denver and in several violent assaults on various Chinese communities in Washington state and Humboldt County, California in 1885-86, as well as in a 1907 riot in Vancouver, Washington, and one in Mexico in 1911. In addition, the violent expulsion of the Chinese from Tonopah, Nevada, which took place in 1903, resulted in one death.

The Chinese were routinely discriminated against by law in many western states until well into the twentieth century and were often extra-legally denied employment opportunities on racial grounds. They were also sometimes driven from various communities by force and occasionally physically assaulted, but the number of deaths recorded is small in comparison with the death toll among Native Americans or the murders of African Americans in the South (usually described under the heading of lynchings) in the same period.

Given the magnitude of the Owyhee massacres in this wider context, that this incident should be so little known is surprising. However, all of the early attempts at a systematic evaluation of the anti-Chinese violence in the American West at this time have noted that much research remains to be done, and that is certainly still the case. Wunder, for example, wrote that “very little attention has been drawn to this particular aspect of American history” and that there are “some riots that cry out for original source documentation.” It is highly likely that prejudice against the Chinese during this time led most EuroAmericans to view the death of persons whom they regarded as belonging to an inferior race as being of less significance than the death of EuroAmericans.

This is not the first time that important, highly unpleasant events have been largely ignored for far too long. Another example is the 1863 Bear River massacre in Utah, which remained largely unnoticed until Brigham Madsen’s book-length study of it. About 250 Shoshone men, women, and children were killed by Euro-American volunteers in an unprovoked attack, which clearly makes this event one of the major acts of violence against Native Americans in the nineteenth century. Madsen speaks of it as “a national catastrophe” but notes that it had been given very little attention until publication of his study.

Another issue is the question of blame for discrete events which clearly should not have taken place, but we are not certain who were the perpetrators. Unfortunately, it cannot be doubted that persons of every human grouping (of which race has been a major category in American life despite the absence of a scientific basis for defining such an entity) have at one time or another committed atrocities. Regardless of who slaughtered the Chinese, these unprovoked attacks in America’s past should be added to the list of acts which must never be repeated.
28

Elmer Rusco

NOTES

1Humboldt Register (2 June 1866), p. 2, col. 2; Territorial Enterprise [Virginia City] (7 June 1866), p. 2, col. 3; Gold Hill News (7 June 1866), p. 2, col. 5; Carson Daily Appeal (8 June 1866), p. 2. Russell Magnaghi compiled a detailed list of items in Comstock newspapers on the Chinese from 1865 to 1881 which has been helpful in writing this article. The index does not, however, contain references to Chinese massacres. See Russell Magnaghi Papers, Nevada Historical Society.


4Rohe and Zhu discuss some of these questions, which are dealt with more fully in a manuscript by the author dealing with Chinese and the law in Nevada.


6This map was drawn by Karen Laramore, based on a map of stagecoach routes through Nevada in the 1860s and topographic maps of the Owyhee area, particularly the United States Geological Survey 1:100,000 maps for southeastern Oregon and southwestern Idaho. See John F. Due, “Road Transport in Nevada: Wagon Freights and Stagecoaches, 1860-1895,” Nevada Historical Society Quarterly, 42:4 (Winter 1999), 223. Its routes are more accurate than those shown on page 29 of Zhu’s book or on the map accompanying the Hanley/Lucia book. Both of these show an impossible route directly connecting Winnemucca, in Nevada, with Silver City. To this date there is still no such highway, although in 2001 there were two places to cross the Owyhee River south of present-day U.S. Route 95 using gravel roads best traveled in a four-wheel-drive vehicle. Personal communication from Tom Christianson, of the Bureau of Land Management office in Vale, Oregon, 11 December 2001.

7Owyhee Avalanche (19 May 1866), p. 3:col. 1.

8Due, “Road Transport in Nevada.”


10Chinaman’s Chance: 52-53.

11Territorial Enterprise (20 April 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (April 24, 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (26 April 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (28 April 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (May 9, 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (16 May 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (17 May 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (18 May 18), p. 3:col. 2; (23 May 1866), p. 3:col. 2; (25 May 1866), p. 2:col. 3; (23 May 1867), p. 3:col. 2; (24 May 1867), p. 3:col. 2.

12Ibid. (25 May 1866), p. 2:col. 3. The earlier report was published on 16 May.

13A Chinaman’s Chance, 48, 3-4, 65.

14Ibid. 55-57.


16Territorial Enterprise, (23 May 1867), p. 3:col. 2; (16 May 1867), p. 3:col. 2.

17Owyhee Avalanche, (19 August 1865), p. 4:col. 1; Chinaman’s Chance, 30.

18Winnemucca Silver State, (12 December 1885), p. 3. Dun Glen is about twenty miles southwest of Winnemucca. A mining community, it was the site of a military camp in 1863 and another such camp which lasted from March 1865 to June 1866. The withdrawal of the troops occurred, reportedly, just before the massacre near the Quinn River. During the latter period, the soldiers stationed there “conducted a number of scouts against hostile Indians on the Overland Route, along the Humboldt River, on the Oregon route through Black Rock Range, in Paradise Valley, and on Quinn River.” George Ruhlen, “Early Nevada Forts,” Nevada Historical Society Quarterly, 7, 3-4 (1964), 23. See also Helen S. Carlson, Nevada Place Names (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1974), 102; Territorial Enterprise (June 7, 1866), p. 2:col. 3.

19Owyhee Avalanche (26 May 1866), p. 3:col. 3. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for

20 Reprinted in *Reno Evening Gazette* (February 26, 1881), p. 3:col. 5.

21 Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California, Bancroft Scraps, Idaho Miscellany, P-H-3. Hubert Howe Bancroft’s History Company did research and published a number of volumes on western history during the last quarter of the nineteenth-century. The volume on Nevada history was written by Frances Fuller Victor.


23 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1867-68, 97.

24 Hanley and Lucia, *Owyhee Trails*, 212.


30 *War Department Report*, 1866, 38.

31 National Archives, Record Group 393, Records of War Department, Part III, E68, Letter Book, District of Boise 1865 and 1866, entry for 4 June 1866.

32 A version of this battle, differing in various details, is given in Hanley and Lucia, *Owyhee Trails*, 70-72. The major did recover the howitzer.


34 Bancroft, *History of Oregon*, 521. The 1866 *War Department Report*, 38, may have accounted for this misinterpretation; it reported that the major “found 500 Indians at the Three Forks of the Owyhee strongly posted on the opposite side of the South fork, between the South fork and Middle fork.”


38 Hanley and Lucia, *Owyhee Trails*, 73-77.

39 *War Department Report*, 1866, 39.

40 *War Department Report*, 1867-68, 77.


42 *War Department Report*, 1866, 37.

43 *War Department Report*, 1867-8, 71.


46 *War Department Report*, 1867-68, 71.


50 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1867-68, 95-103.


52 Wooster, *Military and United States Indian Policy*, 18, 26, 57.
53 War Department Report, 1867-68, 70. See Utley, Frontier Regulars, 322-29, Wooster, Military and United States Indian Policy, 177-78.

54 Shelly Tiley, in conjunction with Archaeological Services, “Native American Knowledge and Perception of the Battle of Infernal Caverns,” report prepared for the Bureau of Land Management, January 2000; Michael Broadhead, “‘This Indian Gibraltar’: The Battle of the Infernal Caverns, 1867,” manuscript loaned to me by the author.

55 For General Crook’s version of this campaign, see Schmitt, General George Crook, 142-59, 307-9.

56 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 198-207; Wooster, Military and United States Indian Policy, 149-51; Broadhead, “‘This Indian Gibraltar,’” 34.


60 Owyhee Avalanche (9 June 1866), p. 2:col. 3.

61 Ibid. (26 May 1866), p. 3:col. 3.


64 Broadhead, “‘This Indian Gibraltar,’” 20; Shelly Tiley, “Native American Knowledge,” 21-23.

65 Owyhee Trails, 53-54; “Northern Paiute Indians,” 298.

66 Sally Zanjani, Sarah Winnemucca (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).


68 Peterson, Idaho, 60.


70 Hanley and Lucia, Owyhee Trails, 57-60.

71 Owyhee Avalanche (5 May 66), p. 2:col. 1.

72 Bancroft, History of Oregon, 520; Hanley and Lucia, Owyhee Trails, 70; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1867-68, 98, 100.

73 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1867-68, 102.

74 Peterson, Idaho, 60; Owyhee Trails (2 June 1866), p. 3:col. 1.

75 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1867-68, 97.


79 Wunder, “Anti-Chinese Violence,” 212. See also Daniels, Anti-Chinese Violence in North America, 59.

80 Madsen, Shoshoni Frontier, 24, ix.
An Interesting Feature of the
New Government's Difficulties
Public Printing in the Western Territories

ROBERT D. ARMSTRONG

The distinguished American bibliographer Wilberforce Eames is said to have advised a colleague to “find the printing and record the imprints, and you will slowly but surely build up a dependable history of the press in any given locality.” He added that “the best evidence of printing at a given place and time is to be found in the signatures of the printers on the pieces produced.” Eames’s reference was not to the printer’s and bibliographer’s term signature that indicates the order in which a volume is put together and bound. He meant instead the name of the printer who had done the work, his name or his firm’s name placed at the bottom of the title page in a ritual identification known as the imprint.

Douglas C. McMurtrie extended Eames’s precept further by saying that “whether one is interested in the history of agriculture, or mining, or religion, or politics, or any other subject, these lists disclose everything printed locally which may throw light on those subjects.” He added a caveat: While “the source materials for printing history are the imprints on the issues of the local press, plus any manuscript records of printing activity,” these latter materials, he wrote, “are relatively seldom to be found.” He might have added further that the light thrown upon these subjects is often very dim, and it is sometimes not there at all. Eames’s principle and McMurtrie’s exposition of it seem clear enough: The study of local printing history is dependent on locating and recording local imprints, with the addition when possible of corroboration from the records of printers who were involved. Other disciplines could benefit as well. Generations of scholars have accepted Eames’s approach to the study of local printing. Compilers and users of regional imprint bibliographies have assumed that

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an imprint on a title page means that the printer whose name appears there executed the work at the place that is named there. But as another distinguished American has remarked, in a different context but with stunning clarity, "It ain't necessarily so."1

In order to appreciate Sportin' Life's irreverent opinion of the way things aren't, and to bring his skeptical view to the study of public printing in the West without disfiguring contortion, it will be useful to examine what the federal government, which paid the bills, expected of its territorial possessions. I will also look at what territorial officers thought of the regulations they were told they must enforce, and the "ain't necessarily so" pragmatism that led officials in territory after territory to avoid the federal impossibilities that were forced on them.2

The elected and appointed officialdom in Washington understood organized territories of the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century to be little more than political and bureaucratic playthings with no rights and few privileges. Before they were well enough established to raise tax money on their own, territories were almost wholly funded by the federal government. The president appointed territorial officers, who were then reviewed and approved (though sometimes not) by the United States Senate. Congress appropriated funds and officials in the executive departments administered them. The interests of territories were represented in Washington chiefly by elected but nonvoting delegates to the House of Representatives. Territorial needs were taken seriously by almost no one. The lack of diligence given to territorial matters frequently resulted in only minimal concern being directed to the apprentice states. Only when their citizens were so frustrated by inaction or by official actions they considered to be wrong did they raise sufficient clamor to be heard in federal offices. Even then they were more often ignored than heeded.

Territorial organization followed the general pattern of the way states were organized, using the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as a model and a congressional "organic act" to activate it. The principal author of the ordinance, Thomas Jefferson, saw to it when he became secretary of state of the new country two years later that his department would have the authority to regulate the nation's organized territories. There was a governor, who seldom felt a great need to consult with his federal colleagues. Governors were often chosen from among the higher ranks of the military, from former state governors who had left or lost their jobs, from relatives of powerful members of Congress or of the president's cabinet, and from especially helpful political operatives who had supported with cash or campaigning the election of a national administration. Territorial chief executives frequently acted as if lesser federal officials and some who clearly outranked them were mere nuisances whose only function was to stand in the way of the enlightened governance that would otherwise flow from their offices. Each territory also had legal officers, courts, and an elected legislature, called the legislative assembly in all of the territories, that
met regularly but infrequently and for short periods of time. Some of these entities occasionally allied themselves with the governor when their interests coincided. But they too looked upon themselves as sovereigns whose natural rights were unnecessarily diluted by the presence of other layers of government.3

Each territory also had a kind of catchall official known by the deceptive title of secretary, whose office a contemporary observer described in grand though not altogether inaccurate terms as “of such majesty that it concentrated in itself the duties and dignities of Treasurer, Comptroller, Secretary of State, and Acting Governor in the Governor’s absence.” The author of these sentiments had worked closely with his brother when the latter gentleman was Nevada Territory’s secretary. Orion Clemens had come from a somewhat lower echelon of candidates for appointive office. Even his mentor, Abraham Lincoln’s attorney general, Edward Bates, allowed Clemens only the most tepid of recommendations. Clemens nevertheless became one of the honest secretaries whose integrity was never questioned, though his quite legal methods and the deliberate speed with which he carried them out occasionally caused consternation in the legislature and in the governor’s office. Some other secretaries in the system had to face circumstances to which they were less than equal, and one can judge the quality of unsuccessful candidates by studying the lack of
wit and understanding of some of those who made it. A later territorial scholar saw the office of the secretary as the refuge of a “glorified clerk” who was seldom more than “a potential governor biding his time.” The man who was soon to become known to the nation and the world as Mark Twain, though his view was colored by his relationship to the secretary he knew best, as well as by his penchant for exaggeration, was nonetheless a close observer of territorial goings-on. While there is truth in both views, Mark Twain’s truth was observed at first hand, and is at least as useful as one drawn from a longer perspective.¹

The historian who dismissed territorial secretaries as little more than political hacks did stress the secretary’s responsibility to appoint a printer to execute official work that was paid for by the federal government. Governors and legislatures often assumed that they controlled the printing mandate, but they did not. Not even the State Department was allowed to determine where the authority lay. The first comptroller of the United States Treasury, a seemingly insignificant officer who had been granted regulatory power by Congress over public printing in all of the territories, issued his orders to the secretary and to no one else, expected the secretary to carry them out, and could bring the considerable weight and wrath of his office to bear on secretaries who chose to challenge the comptroller’s authority. Governors and legislative assemblies could and did try end runs around the secretary’s reflected authority. Legislatures sometimes offered monetary incentives, which some might call bribes, to secretaries to influence their decisions. In the end the governor and legislators inevitably lost; the longer they fought, the more ignominiously they lost. The reason was that the secretary controlled all of the federal money (except for some funds provided to certain legal officers). If the governor wanted his salary and the legislators wanted their travel pay and per diem, they eventually had to retreat and hold their hands out.

But how could a secretary, selected for his political support of the administration in Washington and not for his familiarity with the printing trade (though Clemens and a few others had been printers), find a local printer who was knowledgeable enough and well enough equipped to follow the federal government’s strict requirements in terms of size of type, format (including the elimination of “fat”), and particularly cost? Choice of a printer was after all one of the secretary’s first duties. When the site of a territorial capital had in many cases been proclaimed just a few days earlier, how could a print shop, whose usual task was to produce a newspaper or handbill advertisements for local merchants, be expected to have the necessary sizes of presses and type, or even printers who were competent to use them? And how could an inexperienced secretary know that his choice, once made, had been a good one? He simply could not, because there were almost no good choices in the interior West, and some of those that were good knew better than to take the job.

The treasury’s first comptroller tried to help. His office issued to each new
An Interesting Feature of the New Government's Difficulties

secretary a questionnaire that was designed to identify the printing office with the best equipment and the lowest costs. In the developed East the questions may have made some sense, but in the West they were not always useful. It was not uncommon for a printing office in a new territorial capital to have the only press in existence for many miles around, and sometimes the only one in the territory. That did not necessarily present a problem when the need for government work was low. Once the legislature was in session, however, there were not only new bills for laws to be printed every day (often with revisions the next day and for several days thereafter), but the comptroller’s regulations required the record of legislative proceedings, called journals, to be printed daily and bound together at the end of the session. Newly passed laws also had to be printed when the session was over. Payment from Washington was always slow, sometimes years in coming, and was complicated further during and after the Civil War by the government’s insistence on payment in discredited—and often greatly discounted—greenbacks. The pressure was too much for many printing offices, and more than a few dropped out of contention either before the session began or shortly afterward. Some that made it through the process, expecting to be made wealthy by the government’s largess, learned a hard lesson and never again asked for the privilege.

Printing that had to be done daily had to be done locally, but larger works such as the laws that were printed after the session were more often than not simply too big to be handled by printers and presses in the small territorial capitals of the interior West. It also became common for the daily printing of journals to cease—or never to begin—and for the journals as a whole to be put off until quieter times after the session. The physical bulk of the journals and laws taken together was usually quite substantial, especially in the early years when lawmaking began from scratch and every legislator wanted to get his name on some legislation. Adequate presses and material and the experienced people to operate them were seldom available locally. The isolation of many territorial communities made it often advisable, sometimes necessary, and always cheaper to have these larger pieces printed outside of the territories, in more settled, more typographically sophisticated, and less expensive cities.

Tardy and inconsistent rulings from the Treasury sometimes appeared to require that any and all printing authorized by the federal government be executed within territorial boundaries. Dakota Territory’s first secretary inquired of the comptroller whether his office or the legislative assembly had the authority to name and assign duties to a public printer. He asked this question in late 1861 before the first session met, but received no reply until after the end of the second session, in 1863. Some secretaries may have been waiting their turns to become governors, but in the meantime practical problems with the public printing had to be solved. And most secretaries arrived at the same solution or a variation of it: Send the big jobs elsewhere, often several thousand miles away, but require the de facto printer to put the name of the local public printer on
the title page. One or two early first comptrollers may have suspected that they were being hoodwinked. Later ones tacitly accepted the arrangement, and some even recommended it. During the early developmental periods of many territories, however, secretaries and comptrollers danced a strange and dishonest dance around each other but nonetheless got some printing done at rates that everyone found acceptable.7

Mark Twain again had a colorful and more or less accurate description of his brother’s experience with the public printing, though his characterization is not of a single session, as suggested below, but is an amalgam of all three of Nevada’s territorial sessions. Some of the words are in fact Orion’s, the result of a later brotherly request to him for his recollections.

The matter of printing was from the beginning an interesting feature of the new government’s difficulties. The Secretary was sworn to obey his volume of written “instructions,” and these commanded him to do two certain things, without fail, viz:
1. Get the House and Senate journals printed; and
2. For this work, pay one dollar and fifty cents per “thousand” for composition, and one dollar and fifty cents per “token” for press-work, in green backs.

It was easy to swear to do these two things, but it was entirely impossible to do more than one of them. When greenbacks had gone down to forty cents on the dollar, the prices regularly charged everybody by printing establishments were one dollar and fifty cents per “thousand” and one dollar and fifty cents per “token” in gold. The “instructions” commanded that the Secretary regard a paper dollar issued by the government as equal to any other dollar issued by the government. Hence the printing of the journals was discontinued. Then the United States sternly rebuked the Secretary for disregarding the “instructions,” and warned him to correct his ways. Wherefore he got some printing done, forwarded the bill to Washington with full exhibits of the high prices of things in the Territory, and called attention to a printed market report wherein it would be observed that even hay was two hundred and fifty dollars a ton. The United States responded by subtracting the printing-bill from the Secretary’s suffering salary — and moreover remarked with dense gravity that he would find nothing in his “instructions” requiring him to purchase hay!

Nothing in this world is pall’d in such impenetrable obscurity as a U. S. Treasury Comptroller’s understanding. The very fires of the hereafter could get up nothing more than a fitful glimmer in it.8

The first comptroller during the early years of Orion Clemens’s stewardship of Nevada’s public printing was Elisha Whittlesey, a stern and uncompromising former congressman who was in his second split term as comptroller. In 1855 he had issued a series of regulations that changed the rules as they had previously been understood. In subsequent correspondence with the secretaries of several territories he interpreted his own regulations in several ways, thus helping to bring about himself the confusions that he had by administrative fiat tried to avoid. His ruling that “Public Printing must be executed in the Territory” contributed to the subterfuge resorted to by so many territorial secretaries.9
Minnesota Territory’s public printer during the first legislative session after the 1855 circular did his best to follow it. Whittlesey had decreed that territories that had previously lacked the facilities for daily journal printing now “probably” had them, a foolish assumption farther west. Minnesota did indeed have them, and evidence survives to show that the regulation was honored. No records exist, however, to suggest that it was ever used there again. The only other territory that demonstrably tried to follow Whittlesey’s rules was Nevada during its first session, in 1861. Both Clemens brothers had been printers and were no doubt confident that they could handle any problems that might arise. Nevertheless, the experiment failed. The only print shop in the capital of Carson City, at the newspaper known as the Silver Age, stopped production of the journals early in the session because of an unseemly squabble between the office’s owners. The successor firm refused to continue without prior payment—a demand that Clemens could not meet because it would violate the comptroller’s rules. The partially completed journals had to be sent to San Francisco, augmented with sheets printed there for the previously unprinted portion, then bound and returned to Carson City. Clemens had not yet learned that dishonesty was the best policy, so the journals, accompanied by the laws,
were sent from San Francisco with imprints proclaiming their actual place of printing. Nevada's secretary did not make the same mistake again. The printing location of the laws of the second and third sessions is unknown, though the place cited in the imprints is Virginia City, Nevada Territory. But the presence there in the mid 1860s of sufficient quantities of the required type—useless for anything else on a daily newspaper—is doubtful. Journals of the final two remaining sessions before statehood in 1864 were not printed.10

The situation in Montana Territory was worse yet. It did not have a secretary at all in its first session during 1864-65 because the first two presidential nominees had rejected the offer. By the time another man had been named, accepted by the Senate, and arrived at his new post in the West, Montana had already completed its first session. A legislative commission had prepared journals and laws for publication and the documents were ready to be printed, but there was no printer in the territory who could handle them. The new secretary was a former officer in two rebellions, in Ireland and the United States, and his territorial appointment was proffered more in gratitude for his service with the Union forces in the Civil War than in recognition of his prudence. Thomas Francis Meagher, an imperious man, pressured the departing United States attorney for Montana, over whom he had no authority, to take some of the documents to New York City and get them printed. United States Attorney Edward B. Nealley did in fact go to New York with the laws and one of the journals, but only for a visit. He then continued on to his home state of Maine, where he hired that state's public printers, John L. Stevens and John S. Sayward, to carry out the necessary printing. The laws and the journals of only one of the legislative houses were printed; the other journal did not arrive in time for the Mainers to print it. Winter weather and dwindling territorial funds got the completed volumes returned only as far as Salt Lake City, where they were kept in storage for many months. When they finally arrived in Montana, they bore the imprint of the man whom Meagher had appointed as territorial printer, D. W. Tilton of Virginia City, Montana.11

This time the comptroller was made aware of the actual place of printing, though not in time to do anything about it. After a year and a half, when Stevens and Sayward had received no compensation for their work, they appealed to a former owner of their newspaper, Augusta's Kennebec Journal, who had gone on to a political career in Washington, D.C. James G. Blain, by then a United States congressman about to become speaker of the House (and later to hold even more illustrious appointments), wrote a pleasant note to a new first comptroller, Robert W. Tayler; he sent along with it the printers' bond, and requested that funds be made available to his successors on his hometown newspaper at the earliest moment. Tayler honored Blain's request in four days.12

Montana later demonstrated to all who could see the terrible immaturity of the printing trade in the interior West when the laws passed by the third legislature were printed at home in 1867. Composition, presswork, proofreading,
An Interesting Feature of the New Government's Difficulties

and even the paper used vied with each other for the awfulness prize. A reviewer in the Virginia City Montana Post called the binding "the most creditable part of the work... and... a successful attempt to cover up the poorest specimen of public printing it has been our misfortune to see." The Post may have been an unsuccessful bidder for the appointment as territorial printer, but one need not have had a stake to see that its opinion of the local printing job was, if anything, rather too mild. The volume was simply dreadful. A later Montana public printer admitted as much to the comptroller: "it would be cheaper, in some respects, to execute the public printing within the Territory, if facilities were here to do it. But such is not the case, and of necessity the work must be performed elsewhere." The author of the remark for many years sent the printing to be done in Iowa.\textsuperscript{13}

Idaho Territory had its problems as well. What is now Idaho had had a press as early as 1839, much earlier than other parts of the West except for California and New Mexico. When Idaho entered the territorial system in 1863, however, it was as unprepared as other interior territories to do the larger pieces of its public printing. It was also unprepared to have that printing done elsewhere with anything approaching responsibility, though it must be said that the federal government seems to have been less than vigilant in its administration of Idaho's printing affairs.

The laws and journals of Idaho's 1863-64 first session were printed in San Francisco, while the imprints claimed the territory's first capital, Lewiston, as the printing site. The reason that Secretary William B. Daniels sent the printing to a foreign printer was his politics: Daniels was a devout Republican, and the owner of the only press in northern Idaho was not Republican enough in Daniels' view. Moreover, the legislative assembly had chosen the owner of the press, Frank Kenyon, to be public printer. Daniels won that tiff, of course, but Kenyon was so angry that he sold his newspaper, the Golden Age, and the press that went with it. Alonzo Leland, the new owner, was as loyal a Republican as Kenyon or Daniels, but because Leland had begun his political life as a Democrat he was unacceptable to the secretary. So with a press almost within reach but unavailable to him because of his political rigidity (and probably not adequate to the job anyway), Daniels had to look for another printer. He was hobbled in his search because Congress, perhaps distracted by its Civil War responsibilities, had failed to make an appropriation for the new territory's printing and other legislative expenses. The congressional misstep made it impossible to find a printer in neighboring Oregon who was willing to trust a new and impecunious government in Idaho and a besieged government in Washington, D.C., to make payments in a timely way, if at all. Daniels finally found a willing printer in the San Francisco firm of Vandall, Croisett and Carr. The Oregon printers had been right about timeliness: Vandall \textit{et al.} were still awaiting full payment of their bill seventeen years later.\textsuperscript{14}

B. C. Vandall, the senior partner in the San Francisco printing company, was
a patient and understanding man, whose patriotism may have led him to an unwise decision to accept Idaho's work. He understood that his firm's name could not be officially associated with Idaho's documents and that the name of the secretary's choice as de jure territorial printer, James A. Glascock, was to be part of the imprint of each piece. He also understood that payment would be slow, but thought he could force the release of federal dollars to him by holding the volumes in his office until a treasury draft was in hand. He was wrong.

Shortly after sending the legislative documents to California, Daniels resigned his office in late April 1864, because of Abraham Lincoln's failure—and Daniels looked at it as a presidential failure—to name him governor of Idaho Territory. He continued his official duties until August, but he still had no money and could not pay the printers. Daniels's replacement, Horace C. Gilson, finally received the laws and journals in the new capital of Boise City in November 1865, probably by promising Vandall that he would seek funds from Washington. The printer, by then eager for payment and perhaps needing the space the bound laws and journals took up, in­judi­ciously trusted Gilson to keep his pledge. The arrival of the volumes spurred a small partial payment to Glascock, but whether he sent any of it to Vandall is unknown. The surviving records show no more activity until 1869, when a new territorial secretary responded opaquely to an inquiry from Vandall. The printer did receive "about fifteen thousand dols.," slightly more than half of his bill, as a result. But it was eleven years later that the unusually phlegmatic Vandall asked his United States senator for assistance with the remainder of his bill. Several years earlier a payment of something under two thousand dollars had been made for Vandall, Croisett and Carr but to the administrators of Glascock's estate. And there, disappointingly, the surviving record ends. 15

The printing of the laws and journals for Idaho's second and third sessions can be summarized, though not explained, in two words: embezzlement and embarrassment. When Horace Gilson became secretary in 1865, he appointed Frank Kenyon to be his public printer. There was inadequate printing equipment and no book paper in Boise City, so as their predecessors had done the two men looked for a printer in Oregon and California, finally choosing the San Francisco firm of Towne and Bacon to do the job. Along the way Gilson stole money from the estate of the secretary who had preceded him, along with the territory's available funds in Boise City, about eight thousand dollars. In Oregon, the avaricious secretary withdrew the rest of Idaho's funds, another thirty-five thousand dollars, from the federal depository there, before continuing on to make his printing agreement in California. Then he disappeared. And though he was reportedly seen in many European cities and in New York City for several years afterward, he was never caught and the stolen funds were never recovered.

The burden then fell on Kenyon to restore Idaho's honor, and he failed. Towne and Bacon had subcontracted part of the work to another local establishment,
Valentine and Company, and both firms looked forward to great infusions of government funds. Payment was ultimately certified to Kenyon, but then he got slippery and tried to keep the money away from Towne and Bacon and their subcontractors. Jacob Bacon fulminated often and at great length, but with little immediate effect. At the end of the process, in an alarming display of political insouciance, the federal government had paid Kenyon and Towne and Bacon for the same work. Idaho’s government was happy because it had its books. Kenyon was happy because he had his money. Towne and Bacon had been paid but were not happy because the money had to be shared with Valentine. And one can suppose that Horace C. Gilson was happiest of all.\(^{16}\)

The first secretary of Arizona Territory, Richard C. McCormick, was a printer. When he arrived in Arizona late in 1863 and helped to organize its government, he had a small printing press and a few fonts of type with him, but he intended to establish a newspaper and leave the public printing to others. Emmet A. Bentley was McCormick’s choice to be territorial printer. The usual documents for postsession printing, the laws and legislative journals, were produced during the first session. In addition, the legislative assembly authorized a general code of laws known as the Howell Code. The only press then active in the territory belonged to McCormick’s newspaper, the Arizona Miner, in the capital of Prescott, but it was inadequate to handle even one of the sizable documents. The code was printed in New York City, probably by D. Van Nostrand and Company, under the direct supervision of Secretary McCormick. The secretary also had an Arizona promotional pamphlet produced while he was there. His stay did not involve work only: he also met, wooed, and married a New Jersey socialite. He stayed in the New York area long enough to have the other official documents printed there as well, though only circumstantial evidence exists to support that theory. A visual comparison of the types used in all of the publications suggests that they were all produced by the same printer. The pamphlet bears Van Nostrand’s imprint, but the official documents carry the imprint of the Arizona Miner. No official records exist regarding the printing of the journals and laws.\(^{17}\)

The 1866 laws and journals of the second Arizona session involved a printing office whose principals should have known better, California’s Towne and Bacon. The San Francisco firm was going through the early stages of the Idaho embarrassment. Despite the fierceness of their business competition, printers talk to each other about common problems. Jacob Bacon, who liked to gossip, must surely have been aware of the continuing difficulties encountered by his local colleagues, Vandall, Croisett, and Carr, with Idaho’s first session documents. Yet with only a slight hesitation (to solicit the opinion of a former employee who may have been familiar with one or more of the Arizonans), Towne and Bacon took on the Arizona job, agreeing as before to keep its own name out of the volumes in order to protect the Arizonans from the first comptroller’s displeasure. Still, Towne and Bacon probably counted themselves among the
lucky ones because no law suits were required this time, and after a few minor disallowances by the comptroller the firm was paid—but in the hated greenbacks that were still current.18

Arizona continued to have problems with public printing through much of its territorial existence. Bitter fights between rivals for the territorial printing franchise deteriorated into a smelly contretemps; they finally had to be addressed by a personal representative of the first comptroller who went to Prescott in 1880 and decided for himself which man was wrong and which was less wrong. Unfortunately, he merely suggested that things could be better if only the parties would try. His weak-kneed analysis probably kept knives figuratively drawn long after resolution could have been brought about by a few stern words, followed by strict enforcement of regulations. Both Arizonans and Washingtonians demonstrated how good they were at steering well clear of their responsibilities.19

In early 1851, more than a decade before the earliest difficulties described here took place, Oregon Territory’s public printer similarly had sent the journals and laws of Oregon’s second session to New York City to be printed. Only the laws contained an imprint when the volumes were returned to Oregon, but it showed that the work had been done in Oregon City. The territory’s secretary objected to paying Asahel Bush, the territorial printer, because “the work was done in the City of New York and not in Oregon.” Bush had a reputation for honesty, but when he later sent documents to New York he made sure that the foreign printer indicated in the imprints that the pieces had been done in Oregon by Asahel Bush. The reason was cost. Likewise, San Jose appears in the imprints of the laws and journals of California’s first session during 1849-50, though they were also printed in New York City. The reason again was cost. California began its first session before statehood was declared. It was not a territory, however, and the legislature followed its own rules and was not constrained by the sometimes arbitrary regulations of the Treasury Department. And long after its 1864 admission as a state, Nevada continued to send its postsession printing to San Francisco, sometimes to Towne and Bacon, simply because of cost. The practice continued regularly until the state legislature changed the law at its 1877 session. Even after the official change, the economics of the printing business meant sending the larger works to San Francisco until a complete printing office could be established in Carson City in the early eighties.20

Curiously, three territories that entered the system in the 1860s—Colorado and Dakota in 1861 and Wyoming seven years later—appear not to have sent laws and journals elsewhere to be printed. Their printing industries were as underdeveloped as those in other new territories, but their relative closeness to more mature printing communities may have eased their acquisition of printing material and printers. Farther west, though, where water routes and land routes were longer, mountainous terrain was more daunting, winter weather
caused lengthy delays, and costs to transport heavy equipment were commensurately higher, few secretaries could count on the ready availability of adequate presses and material.

What were the special conditions on the western frontier that caused many territorial secretaries to believe that in order to carry out their federal mandates they must necessarily circumvent federal regulations? Isolation from the rule makers was an important factor. What the comptroller did not know and had little chance to discover was a bonus for secretaries, and they became good at swearing fealty to the regulations while at the same time doing whatever it took to avoid following them. There was little danger that the comptroller would show up unannounced in a secretary’s office to chide him for skirting the rules. A short and ineffectual journey to Arizona Territory by a comptroller’s subordinate in 1880 was unusual and perhaps unique. The most serious and severe questioning a secretary could expect would come from his territorial delegate to Congress or from a disaffected former ally who for political or personal reasons had turned against him. Newspapers whose job offices had lost a printing contract from a secretary might engage in editorial bluster, but their screeds were rarely treated seriously in Washington, if they even got that far. Each secretary knew that his job was to get certain documents printed without straying noticeably from federal guidelines and deadlines and budgetary constraints. If a little lying was necessary to achieve that goal, what permanent harm could possibly be done? Many secretaries did not fully understand the bureaucratic mind and its insistence on strict enforcement of the rules, no matter how impracticable, but neither did Washingtonians fully appreciate the dilemmas they had caused for their territorial factors. They were not wholly aware, either, of the ingenuity that necessity could bring about, nor of the pleasure some secretaries experienced when outwitting their Washington tormentors.

The process by which “foreign” printers were chosen remains puzzling. Though a few secretaries had some experience in the trade, most were printing naïfs. To select a printing establishment that was hundreds or thousands of miles distant and expect the resulting printed documents to be at least competently done would in most cases require an intervenor. That would probably be the appointed local public printer, but the connections that caused him to opt for a firm in the Midwest or East instead of a much closer one are obscured by the paucity of printers’ records.

In the essentially perpetual struggle for the upper hand, it was probably the entrenched federal bureaucrats who could with the least effort have set aside the most stringent and noxious of their demands and made reasonable overtures to the isolated officers in the territories. Secretaries, after all, had no power to bring about real change on their own. They were forced by their subservient position to do as they were told, at least openly. They had to find ways to get
around Washington's seemingly absolute control over them without attracting the attention of the first comptroller. It is altogether likely, in fact, that the comptroller's emissary sent to investigate printing irregularities in Arizona, a functionary named Dr. Thomas Robinson, could have changed the course of the relationship between Washington and the territories for good—and certainly for the better—during his brief western investigation of allegations brought against a secretary by a defeated and bitter foe of long standing. Instead, Robinson saw his charge narrowly and merely reported that he found that things were less bad than claimed, that the accuser was less trustworthy than the accused, and that things should for the time being remain as they had always been.

There were other missed opportunities as well, before and after Robinson's visit, but each involved the unacceptable chance that someone must give up some of his power. It was not until new ideas, if hardly radical ones, were allowed into the comptroller's office that even small changes could be allowed. They came slowly and with much difficulty, and only with the appointment of new first comptrollers who were not as hidebound and inflexible as their predecessors.

So gradually and over a needlessly long period of time, a semblance of reason came to the Treasury Department's handling of public printing in the territories. Comptrollers eventually allowed, sometimes even encouraged, secretaries to send printing orders outside of their territories. In 1881, for instance, comptroller William Lawrence suggested to Montana's secretary that he might have his printing done in Galdand, California, where Arizona's 1879 journals had been done. He also recommended a printer in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, and quoted prices for which the Salt Lake printer had recently done Utah's work. Such a recognition of reality could never have left the Treasury twenty years earlier.  

Even so, outside printers were still sometimes encouraged to use the name of the public printer in the imprint in order to keep up the unnecessary fiction that public printing had been done in the territories. As late as 1887, a new Arizona code of laws was sent to Saint Louis to be printed, though the resulting volume bore the imprint of a Prescott newspaper's job office. But the Missouri printer did not complete the work by the effective date of the new laws. The very real problem caused by the delay was that the new code negated all of the territory's previous laws, and for two weeks Arizona was more than usually lawless. Sometimes the outsiders were allowed to use their own names, but had them relegated to the less prestigious, and less noticeable, verso of the title page, as an Omaha printer did for some Idaho documents. But at the same time others openly used their own names in the usual recto position. And another Arizona public printer, probably as the result of a spiteful secretary's act, was unaware of his identification as printer until the books, printed in California, arrived in Prescott. A Chicago printer took one of the more unusual ap-
An Interesting Feature of the New Government's Difficulties

approaches: He put his own establishment's name in the recto imprint of a Montana volume but subcontracted the printing to a printer in Madison, Wisconsin, whose name appeared on the verso. Other subcontractors subcontracted further, but without allowing formal recognition of the printer who may have done the bulk of the work, as occurred when two San Francisco printers did the work but ascribed it to Idaho's public printer. Government confusion and inconsistency, overlaid with favoritism for well-connected secretaries or those who were willing to truckle, meant that the system that existed so sternly, if confoundingly, on paper, made sense to no one. It was open to almost any interpretation an imaginative (or unimaginative) government official might want to put on it.22

Indeed, there was enough confusion within the Treasury Department itself to bring to grief even the secretaries who were most willing to follow their instructions as closely as they could. Officials in several territories were apparently able to find local printers whose abilities and whose equipment were sophisticated enough, and whose sources of supply were close enough and cheap enough to execute all but the largest and most complicated of volumes. But many more secretaries could not find competent or willing printers locally. Their goodwill and good intentions and real dread of losing their jobs could not relieve many secretaries, or the public printers whom they entrusted with their livelihoods and reputations, from taking the course that unavoidably led to subterfuge and outright lies. The rewards for honesty were too slim and the payoff for mendacity too great for most who were directly involved with territorial public printing, the secretaries and the printers themselves. Orion Clemens's disastrous experiment with the truth soon led him to play less risky games with the rigid rules of the Washington bureaucracy. So when the choice became following the rules or following the means of survival, rules ran in most instances a poor second.

It should by now be clear that an imprint on a piece of western public printing from late in the nineteenth century is not an infallible indicator of the piece's origin. An imprint can be accurate, but it can also be wrong by several thousand miles and the name of at least one printer. So what are we to believe? Perhaps more important, why should we care?

Bibliographers, those people whose arcane branch of scholarship involves the study of printing and its history, should look at every printed piece from the era, including an imprint if present, with practiced skepticism. And if solid, even incontrovertible evidence does not exist that a piece was printed by the printer named in the imprint, at the place indicated in the imprint or elsewhere in the piece, then the process of discovering who actually did the printing, and where, should begin. Several sources, including internal ones, should be investigated for any piece whose imprint seems questionable.
When government records and correspondence exist, as they often do—in federal or state or local archives or in historical societies or in academic or private libraries—they may contain clues that can suggest, if not necessarily prove, the existence of a phantom printer whose connection with the piece is not otherwise mentioned or suspected. State archives can sometimes own only one end of a correspondence, which can take on meaning only when matched with the other end held in the appropriate federal archives. But correspondence of printers and other officials with secretaries has often been lost altogether or simply discarded when no longer needed. In one state archive there is not a scrap of the correspondence of any of the territory’s many secretaries, apparently because they took their records with them when they left office. As useful as it can sometimes be, the contemporary practice of records management, with its need to empty storehouses of records no longer required for routine work, must share the blame for the disappearance of documents that might solve many of the mysteries that face those who investigate printing practices as recent as the late nineteenth century. Archivists and the staffs of historical societies and academic libraries tend to have performed better with the preservation of essential records.

When the business records and correspondence of the ostensible printer exist, as they often do not, they should be examined carefully, and further searches should be made if questions still remain. Far too often one reaches a dead end, but the effort should be taken as far as possible, including requests for assistance from the still extant successors of printing establishments that functioned as de jure or de facto public printers for territorial governments. These businesses can be difficult or impossible to find because of corporate name changes or changes of location, and the results are seldom desirable because records have been discarded as extraneous or too space-consuming for modern business survival. Again, records managers may have failed to recognize the value of superannuated records. Sometimes these records have been donated to, or saved from destruction by, public or private institutions. Towne and Bacon’s records are in one California library, for instance, the gift of an early Towne family member, and some of the correspondence is in another, the donation of a later member of the same family. Some of the records of a Chicago firm that did work for Montana Territory are in a library in that city, but relevant data are missing. Douglas McMurtrie’s observation regarding the scarcity of printer’s records is unfortunately all too true.

One of the better sources for discussions of outside printing is contemporary newspapers, especially those published by journalistic or political rivals of the winner of the government contract. Newspapers of the period, even those with “Independent” in their titles, were usually fiercely partisan. When one paper won a printing contract that another paper’s owner thought was rightfully his, the loser might be moved to release damaging information about his successful rival or about the secretary’s selection process or about the real place
of printing. A battered ego could provide strong incentive to reveal secrets that the winning printer would prefer to keep to himself. If the loser was truculent enough and vindictive enough he might reveal enough in his own newspaper to cause great discomfort and embarrassment to the public printer and secretary and, incidentally, to provide a great deal of information otherwise unavailable to the serious researcher.

Even if nothing specific appears in any of these sources, however, the three of them taken together can produce an enticing clue or two that can be followed to, or close to, the printer(s) or printing establishment(s) that actually performed the work. And if they do not, they can still provide valuable negative evidence to suggest that the imprint is legitimate. Not until these tests have been undertaken, however, should a researcher feel relatively at ease with accepting the name in the imprint as that of the actual printer. Those who care about such things—historians and bibliographers and others who are interested in accuracy in the record and the implications of that record—should be skeptical of an imprint’s claim that a volume was executed in a territorial capital when that capital was one having fewer citizens than the number of pages in the book. They should investigate all possible sources of information, not only the obvious and often false statement of responsibility on a volume’s title page.

There should be another test: Was there enough money in the process to keep an industrious printer from changing the way he made his living? The answer is seldom easy to find. We know the rates allowed by the Treasury, often paid in the hated greenbacks, but one could wish that a greater abundance of printers’ union scales and the rates allowed by employing printers were available. We can hope, too, that those familiar with small town economics in the American West will give some attention to it. The matter of printing is still “an interesting feature of the... government’s difficulties.”

The larger question remains, however: Why should anyone care? Bibliographical arcana are of interest to book specialists such as collectors, rare-book librarians, antiquarian booksellers, and a small number of academics, but why should anyone else even wonder about such things?

Perhaps we can begin to answer the question by asking another one. Is it likely that a new, small, isolated community of a few hundred residents would have been able to support with its business activity a printing establishment capable of producing in a short period of time as many as fifteen hundred copies of a volume of, say, eight hundred pages, with type of a size that is useful for little beyond government work, and that must be set by hand, letter by letter? Arizona’s experience with first-session printing argues that it is not. Secretary McCormick, a printer himself, took the work to New York City rather than attempt to have it done in the territory. McCormick owned the local press, knew its capabilities, and apparently gave no thought to having the volumes printed at home. Nevada’s secretary, a printer with a brother who was also a
printer living in his house, tried to have the first session's journals done in Carson City, but argumentative and obdurate printers made that impossible. Some of the work that was completed before the messy disagreements began had to be corrected when it was sent to San Francisco, along with the laws, to be finished. These problems arose with first-session documents in the early to mid 1860s, but after Montana Territory's seventh session, during 1871-72, James H. Mills, a printer who later became secretary, took the laws and journals to Washington, D.C., to be printed. From the 1840s through at least the 1880s, many public printers with printing offices of their own took or sent their territory's larger works to California, Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, New York, the District of Columbia, and very likely other places because they could either not handle them at all or could not handle them as cheaply, even with transportation costs added in. So it appears that the question asked above can be answered principally in the negative, despite the apparent success of local printing in Colorado, Dakota, and Wyoming territories. And that conclusion calls seriously into question the likelihood that printing at home was even possible in most isolated places.

A small western capital with one or more newspapers may have produced dozens of large pieces of printing with its name proudly and prominently displayed in the imprints. Local merchants and boosters must surely have been pleased to live in a community that could boast of such advanced technology. But unless it can be shown—by an inventory of presses of adequate size and an identification of other material readily and inexpensively available to the local craft—that the possibility exists that volumes were actually printed there and not farmed out to more established printers elsewhere, any speculation as to the amounts and other kinds of business transacted there will be unreasonably skewed or downright wrong. If the people who study the printing phenomenon cannot be sure of the size and sophistication of the printing trade in a town, how then can urban historians and economic historians or anyone else rely on the information in bibliographical studies in coming to reasonable judgments about, for example, the amount or quality of economic activity there, or the development of political movements, or the cultural level of an area? If local pharmacies and hardware stores and restaurants were advertised in local papers, a certain level of activity is suggested; if similar businesses from nearby or faraway towns are advertised, a quite different story is told.

And was this a phenomenon to be encountered only in the western United States, and only during the last part of the nineteenth century, and only under the circumstances discussed here? Were only those inland territories that were difficult to get to—and thus to get heavy and bulky printing material to—forced into deceit? What of those territorial officials who did not find it necessary to dissemble, those in Colorado and Dakota and Wyoming? Was it because of their proximity to and ease of transportation from well-established sources of supply? Was it the railroad in the case of Wyoming, which in part came into
existence in 1868 because of the transcontinental race of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads, that made it easy to deliver printers and printing equipment to Cheyenne? Perhaps the Missouri River served the same function in Dakota Territory, whose capitals, both of them, were directly on the river; both Yankton and Bismarck had railroads as well. Maybe the gradual slope of the plains leading to Denver made relatively easy the delivery of printing material to Colorado’s principal settlement. Minnesota had the vast and navigable Mississippi River and its many tributaries to bring equipment and material and printers to Saint Paul and its rival, Minneapolis. Whatever the case for these territories, it is true that others in the West had grave problems, some of them involving difficult terrain, some involving the late coming of the railroad to such outposts as Helena, Montana (1883) and Prescott, Arizona (1887), some involving great and long-lasting snow blockades at critical times on already existing railroads or wagon roads.

Douglas McMurtrie’s own studies, and the enormous volume of bibliographical work done under his supervision for the federal Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, provide a significant body of information for later researchers to investigate and to bring, in time, under a more searching discipline than McMurtrie or the WPA were able to exert. If these studies are ignored, if allowed to stand as they presently are with all the many faults, oversights, omissions, errors, and lack of rigorous examination, the history of printing in America will remain essentially where it was at the death of the WPA at the beginning of World War II. McMurtrie’s aim, and that of the American Imprints Inventory within the WPA, was to lay out and describe for later scholars, using Wilberforce Eames’s example, the raw materials for the study of virtually any discipline. The history of the press in America was of course included. Too much of what was done then still awaits vigorous re-examination and questioning, and the wait has been too long. American bibliography and the fields that in part rely on it for accurate information must do better if anyone is to take their efforts seriously.

Toying with the truth may have been a peculiarly western way of doing things and it may have been limited for the most part to the nineteenth century. There is ample evidence to show that governments were not the only ones to send printing orders outside the area of origin to be executed, then returned with imprints indicating that they had been done at home. Until bibliographers and others have looked at other emerging or isolated areas and have found different practices, reliance on imprints alone in those areas, too, must necessarily be suspect. The frontier moved rapidly in the United States, often leaving backwaters with less than adequate printers operating less than adequate machinery with less than adequate material and less than adequate skill, and at a much higher cost than in larger communities. Nonetheless, the citizens and businessmen of these localities expected service, including printing that could match their ideas of the latest styles and the wonder and
worldliness to be found in the largest cities. If it could happen here, why not in Australia’s outback or the pampas of Argentina or Canada’s prairie and western provinces? Why not, for that matter, in any region that is affected by the economics of isolation during its earliest, formative period, whether in the American West in the 1800s or the American East in the 1600s and 1700s? Scholars, especially bibliographers, who insist that imprints mean what they say, will increasingly—and properly—be taken to task for doing a less than thoughtful and thorough job.

But bibliographers, who are sometimes at the beginning of this investigative process, should not be alone in accepting responsibility for discovering past deceptions. Anyone who uses written words, printed or not, to explore and understand and explain what has gone on before, should—must—be skeptical of what the record claims to be true. Anyone who fails to attempt this separation, however, can never honestly claim a thorough study of bibliography, history, astronomy, forensic psychiatry, the law, genealogy, the economy, “or any other subject” that requires an honest examination of what truly has happened before. It is seldom easy, it is often impossible, to make the critical separations between what is claimed—perhaps innocently, perhaps not—and what is factual. It is seldom easy; it is always necessary to try.
An Interesting Feature of the New Government’s Difficulties

NOTES

1Douglas C. McMurtrie, “Locating the Printed Source Materials for United States History, with a Bibliography of Lists of Regional Imprints,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 31 (December 1944), 372, 377. Eames’s comment was published seven years after his death in 1937 and shortly after McMurtrie’s own death in 1944. McMurtrie does not enclose it in quotation marks, but, despite his earned reputation for less-than-careful scholarship, it can probably be reasonably assumed to represent Eames’s view of the best result of properly conducted imprint research. Sportin’ Life is a character in George Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess, with libretto by Du Bose Heywood and Ira Gershwin (1935).


5United States Statutes at Large (1842), Vol. 5, p. 542. The first in first comptroller does not indicate rank, but only a difference of duties from the second comptroller. The same is true of the numerical designations of the department’s six auditors.

6“Printing Establishments in the Territories,” Treasury Department, Comptroller’s Office, 9 May 1863. This is the earliest printed version of the questionnaire I have seen, though there are manuscript copies for 18 November 1861 in Clemens’s Letterbook, Nevada State Library and Archives, Carson City; “Circular,” Treasury Department, Comptroller’s Office, 19 October 1855. Before this printed broadside was issued, the comptroller’s office assumed that larger territorial publications—laws, journals, and supreme court reports—would not be printed in new territories because of inadequate facilities there. There was no such assumption with older territories, though they sometimes sent these volumes elsewhere as well.

7John Hutchinson to Elisha Whittlesey, first comptroller, 6 December 1861, Territorial Letters Received [THR], Vol. 5, Record Group 217, Records of Accounting Officers of the Treasury Department [RG217], National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. William Hemphill Jones, acting comptroller, to Hutchinson, 10 January 1863, Territorial Letters Sent [TLS], Vol. 7, RG217.

8Twain, Roughing It, 188-89. Orion Clemens to Robert W. Tayler, first comptroller, 4 October 1869 and 3 January 1870, TLR, vols. 9, 10.


10Minnesota Territorial Council and House Journals, 1856 session, Boxes 1 17.E.1. IB and 1 17.F.2. 10F, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul; Clemens to Whittlesey, 24 December 1861, TLR, vol. 5; Clemens to William Martin Gillespie, 21 December 1861, and 15 February, 12 March, 7 April 1862, Letterbook; Abstract C, Voucher 38, 18 January 1862, RG217.

11Pomeroy, Territories and the United States, 139; Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 1864-89 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 35 et seq; Montana Post, Virginia City (27 January, 2 June 1866); James Tufts to John L. Stevens and John S. Sayward, 2 September 1867; Miscellaneous Treasury Account [MTA] 162972, First Auditor’s Office, RG217; Edward B. Nealley to Thomas F. Meagher, 17 August 1866; Small Collection 309, Montana State Archives, Helena.


13Montana Post (26 January 1867); Robert E. Fisk to Tayler, 22 November 1874, TLR 1; Robert


19Thomas Robinson to Carl Schurz, 12 October 1880, and Robinson to John Sherman, 12 October 1880, TLS 11.


21William Lawrence to James H. Mills, 15 October 1880; TLS 11.

22Jay J. Wagoner, Arizona Territory, 1863-1912: A Political History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), 226. Idaho's fourteenth session Revised Statutes of 1887 carried the verso imprint of Henry Gibson of the Omaha Republican; in correspondence from E.J. Curtis, Idaho's secretary, Gibson is referred to as "Public Printer of Idaho." E. J. Curtis to Charles A. Clark, 2 July 1887, Secretary's Correspondence, 18 April 1886-24 March 1888, Territorial Archives, Idaho State Archives, Boise; Arizona Miner [Prescott] (20 June and 13, 26, 28 July 1881). Volume 4 of Montana's Supreme Court Reports bears the recto imprint of Callaghan and Company, Chicago, while the name of David Atwood of Madison appears on the verso. No Montana printer's name is present in the volume.

H. Lee Barnes, a decorated Special Forces veteran who served in South Vietnam near the Laotian border and is now a member of the faculty at the Community College of Southern Nevada, tells great stories. His six short stories and one novella are engaging and compelling reading, with themes that capture the moral and ethical complexity of the era with precision and sensitivity. His descriptions of the contemporary United States and Vietnam are vivid and true; and his characters and dialogue faithfully transport one back to this earlier, sometimes humorous but more often painful period and its aftermath.

The difficulty in determining when reality ends and fiction begins testifies not only to Barnes's storytelling ability but also to his acute understanding of the era, its participants, and its survivors. Readers seeking realistic insights into the experience of America's longest war can find much to ponder in these stories. Soldiers go to war in the wake of failed love affairs, in search of adventure and glory, to avoid jail, and out of sheer inertia and the absence of alternatives. Those lacking alternatives were most frequently poor and people of color. Race and income level were all too often decisive in answering the question, "Who decides when a boy's world ends?" (p. 54)

Once in Vietnam, American soldiers found an alien climate and culture. Even a boy from the Nevada desert "sweated in places" he had "never sweated before" (p. 86) and was alternately amazed first at the fine dust and then at the rain that turned a firebase in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon into a fungus. American GIs also found a formless, seemingly senseless struggle. Combat was "like having a nightmare as a kid" only to "wake up and it's still there and you're a part of it . . . You know what's going down and your body acts, but your mind keeps telling you it's a dream." (p. 131) The body count, our government's official method of determining progress, meant little if "it didn't stop the war." Hundreds of enemy dead made no difference if the grunts were not "alive to do the counting, and survival amounted to spitting in the right direction." (pp. 97, 126) Ethics were equally elusive. The stuff of college philosophy classes held little relevance. "The polar facts were firepower and body bags. Everything in between was as relative as the next breath or the next heartbeat." (p. 64) Trust was the ultimate key to survival. "They trusted their weapons, their skills, but mostly each other." (p. 74) And the "most fitting question" was, "Were you a good soldier?" (p. 68)
Barnes also has much to say about the survivors, be they veterans or loved ones, who found that in the wake of war "ghosts come out." (p. 59) Rowe returned to Las Vegas having lost his girlfriend, his closest buddy, and all sense of purpose. Malaria was his only tangible reward for fifteen months in Vietnam. Lum survived being shot by a United States marine, sought refuge in Boulder City, and rather typically attempted to forget Vietnam only to be forced to confront old demons as a former comrade blew himself up on the steps of the Pentagon. Stories about two fathers probed the sorrows that came with losing sons. Calvin Widerly traveled to Vietnam seeking information about Robert, who had been captured and kept in a cage as a holy man with the alleged power to protect his captors against American bombs. Calvin returned with his son’s dog tags and the recollections of a young woman who many years before had seen Robert pass through her village in his cage. Marvin Prosette and his wife met the train that brought home Casey’s remains some fifteen years after he had been declared missing in action in 1969. Marvin, who had previously alienated many of his neighbors by demanding to know where and how Casey had died, took the sterile aluminum casket to the open grave that had been prepared many years before and remained ready for its occupant.

Finally, Barnes offers some provocative symbolic touches, such as the baseball game organized by a North Vietnamese army colonel against an American unit in the A Shau Valley. The colonel suggested that they "play until we can play no more," an approach much like the enemy’s strategy for fighting the war. (p. 13) Similarly, at least two soldiers made their peace with the conflict by leaving the war under curious circumstances: Paez disappeared into a Vietnamese tunnel without a trace of his having been killed by the enemy; Stonehands rescued a tiger cub and strode into the jungle to join the tigress. He saved the cub because it "ain’t right to mess with the natural." (p. 23) Stonehands would have agreed with Steve Tice, a Nevada soldier who survived Hamburger Hill. In the midst of a Vietnamese storm in which the wind, rain, and lightning were so strong that the war literally stopped, Tice recognized that "God doesn’t like this." (Parallels: Hansen, Owen, and Madden [New York, 1992], 219)

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With the success of the American conservative movement in the late twentieth century, the attention of historians has shifted to the Right. Radicals, progressives, and liberals have exited stage left with the spotlight now fixed on conservative activists and ideologues. Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, William F. Buckley, Jr., George Wallace, James Burnham, and Whitaker Chambers have found their biographers. Historians have also begun to explore the mobilization of conservative groups like the John Birch Society, Young Americans for Freedom, Right to Life, and Moral Majority while detailing anticommunist, libertarian, and evangelical worldviews. The result has been a more textured conceptualization of recent American political and social history. No longer perceived as merely standpatters, reactionaries, and spoilers, conservatives have taken their rightful place as agents of change dedicated to their visions of the good society.

The new focus, while sharpening our understanding, has primarily been on national leaders and groups. Little has appeared on activities at the local level, and the mobilization of conservatives at the grass-roots seems reflexive and mechanical. Using archival sources, local newspapers, and more than three dozen oral histories, Lisa McGirr attempts to redress this with her *Suburban Warriors*, a case study of conservatives in Orange County, California. Like the Dallas suburbs, the Phoenix metropolitan area, and Cobb County, Georgia, Orange County is a central hive of conservative activism generating members and funds for right-wing movements. With national events in the background, McGirr traces the evolution of movement identity and institutional networking as Orange County conservatives battled liberals in school board elections, attended anticommunist schools, won control of state political organizations, beat the bushes for votes in the 1964 Goldwater presidential campaign and Reagan’s race for governor in 1966, and mobilized single-issue campaigns during the 1970s. McGirr argues that those who rallied to the conservative banner were not socially or economically marginal. They were highly educated, middle class, and “thoroughly modern” men and women who embraced consumer culture while rejecting secularism and relativism. Their effort was not a retreat into the past. Rather, they championed law and moral order, property rights, anticommunism, family, limited government, and individualism to contest control of the present and future.

McGirr suggests several factors that shaped the conservative milieu of Orange County. This was the land of the white middle class, secure in single-family homes, and financially flush directly or indirectly from Cold War defense spending. Realizing their American dreams in the perfection of California and denying the hand of the federal government in their success only reinforced a western ethos of individualism and self-reliance. Suburban and
homogeneous, Orange County and its views were not constricted by urban problems, and minorities were invisible figuratively and literally. Newspaper editors, ministers, businessmen, and other right-wing opinion makers played to the political, religious, and cultural traditions of migrants, and nurtured the culture of conservatism by word and deed. Without countervailing pressures, there was little to dent the conservative consensus. McGirr’s handling of this interplay is insightful, and *Suburban Warriors* works particularly well in creating the setting for California conservatism.

While the narrative provides much information about grass-roots activity, serious shortcomings undercut its significance. A chapter on the worldview of local activists is primarily a restatement of the speeches of national politicians, writings of major conservative thinkers, or the conclusions of scholars. McGirr undercuts her discussion of the interaction of class, race, religion, and elite authorities in shaping a conservative stance by resurrecting in a new guise the long-discarded “marginal man” explanation of right-wing activism. Although having explicitly rejected this interpretation early in the book, she hypothesizes nevertheless that the “social atomization” caused by private home ownership, the lack of public spaces, and recent residency led suburban conservatives to search for community in right-wing organizations. McGirr offers no evidence to support her claim. Did conservatives have real grievances or did they engage in symbolic politics? Would such psychological needs make all suburbanites receptive to conservative contagion? Are suburban liberals plagued with the same angst? Gender, meanwhile, receives only brief treatment.

Curiously, McGirr cites aggregate voting returns often, but does nothing to analyze the many elections discussed. There is no breakdown of the conservative vote to reveal precinct or district demographics. Liberal areas are not compared to conservative ones. As to the socioeconomic characteristics of her suburban warriors, McGirr offers data about only 35 local leaders and 110 individuals who wrote letters with conservative messages to the newspapers. She assumes that these men and women are representative of the rank and file, but offers no support. Using blunt and meaningless classifications of “middle class” and “working class,” McGirr does little to tease the nuances from her data. No tables are presented to summarize findings. Are property tax records available to mark delineations more carefully? What are the occupational mobility histories of these activists? How do these men and women compare to Orange County’s liberal activists? More important, McGirr failed to sample names from readily available election petitions and organizational rosters to create a collective biography of the movement’s membership. In spite of the effort to illuminate the grass-roots, the identities of Orange County’s suburban warriors remain hidden.

The modern conservative movement has begun to receive serious scholarly treatment. Historians have moved beyond easy explanations that classify conservatives as reactionary misfits and now judge them as important challengers
of American liberalism who gather resources and seek power to effect a pro-
gram of change. National events and personalities have received their share of
attention. The grass-roots still demand examination. There, the histories of or-
dinary men and women offer the keys to understand how the course of Ameri-

can history shifted so dramatically to the Right.

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Growing Up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of Cali-

Much has been written about first- and second-generation Japanese Ameri-
cans, the Issei and Nisei. Ink started flowing soon after the first significant wave
of Japanese immigrants landed on the West Coast around 1900, and over the
ensuing decades the Nikkei—Japanese people—have been characterized (or caricatured) in various ways. In rough chronology, they have been portrayed
as a “yellow peril,” a wartime threat, the hapless victims of prejudice, and (es-
pecially in the case of the Nisei) a model minority that ultimately managed to
succeed and become assimilated despite overwhelming odds. Prior to and dur-
ing World War II, negative images predominated; of course, and even the more
professional and sympathetic analysts viewed both generations as problem
groups whose troubles stemmed largely from their failure to become sufficiently
Americanized.

Reflecting a recent trend in ethnic studies, Growing Up Nisei explores the
world of the second-generation Japanese of California from the inside to arrive
at a fuller understanding of identity formation. Historian David K. Yoo argues
that “issues like race, generation, and culture” operated on the lives and minds
of the Nisei within “a crucible of time marked by racial subordination, eco-
nomic depression, a world at war, and mass incarceration” to create complex
and rather extraordinary identity conflicts and outcomes (p. ix). As they
struggled to understand their place in American society, the Nisei had to con-
tend with racism and parental expectations. But they also negotiated within
the parameters others tried to set for them. Yoo believes that the most signifi-
cant institutions involved in the formation and expression of Nisei identity
were Japanese student clubs and language schools, Nisei organizations spon-
sored by the Japanese Christian and Buddhist churches, and the English-
language sections of the immigrant newspapers. Though these institutions
were created in response to prejudice, and often to further the aims of the Issei,
within them the Nisei were able to exercise a good deal of agency and confront
identity issues on their own terms. Unlike most previous scholars, Yoo describes the years leading up the war as the crucially formative ones for Nisei identity, and he views identity conflicts long associated with the wartime incarceration as a continuation of a lengthy group dialogue.

_Growing Up Nisei_ is based on dissertation research that began at Yale University, under Howard Lamar, Bill Cronon, and David Montgomery. Additional years spent researching and writing in southern California allowed Yoo to profit from suggestions offered by Yuji Ichioka, Valerie Matsumoto, Arthur Hansen, and other accomplished historians. The result is a solid scholarly study that also captures the voices of young Nisei men and women (mainly through recorded words from the period, rather than retrospective oral histories). Throughout the book, the author skillfully juxtaposes the opinions of outside “expert” observers against those of the Nisei in order to highlight flaws in reasoning. He tells, for example, how a 1928 article by the sociologist Emory Bogardus admonished the Nisei to recognize and overcome the traits that aroused race prejudice, then quotes a Nisei from another study as stating: “You know as well as I do that a Japanese, although well educated, has never an equal opportunity with an American, no matter how uneducated that American may be.” In other words, as Yoo concludes, “The persistence of racism dampened social scientific claims for assimilation” (pp. 24-25).

Yoo’s major contribution emerges in the first three chapters, where he explores Nisei institutional participation for fresh insights on identity formation. In various ways, these institutions reportedly reinforced generational, cultural, and racial-ethnic ties, especially as the Nisei reached their teens and the racial barrier erected by white society became more apparent. The Great Depression further limited prospects for finding employment as the Nisei came of age. Given the circumstances, many Nisei questioned whether they should pursue an American college education or seek a brighter future in Japan. Many also felt compelled to bridge the cultural gaps between their parents (Japanese nationals ineligible for United States citizenship) and American society, particularly as international relations deteriorated in the late 1930s. Nisei institutions emerged as necessary forums where the second generation could find sanctuary from racism, air their thoughts and concerns, and debate issues ranging from international affairs to changing gender roles and expectations.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with World War II and the effects that mass evacuation, incarceration, and resettlement had on Nisei identity. The war all but destroyed many of the traditional Nisei institutions. But Yoo finds that the Nisei quickly established new outlets for cultural expression and protest against racial injustice inside their camp—schools and church groups and within the pages of the Japanese-American newspapers that operated in the “free zones” of the interior West. However, the examples and data to support the author’s contentions in these chapters are not as rich and nuanced as in the earlier ones. Fewer than ten pages deal with religion in the camps, for instance, and Yoo
completely ignores the newspapers printed within the camps, which, though heavily censored, may have offered relevant data.

Yoo acknowledges other limitations of his investigation. His resources deal mainly with the Nisei of California's major cities, Los Angeles and San Francisco, and not the rural counties that were home to many of the California Nisei. His book probably offers even fewer insights on identity formation among the Nisei of Nevada and other interior states, where Japanese institutions were far less prevalent and the Nisei participated more fully in mainstream schools (and churches in some cases). Nonetheless, this is a valuable addition to the literature dealing with Japanese America and ethnic identity formation.

Andrew B. Russell
Tempe, Arizona


Those of you who think nothing new can be written about the California Gold Rush—think again. These two books are virtual companion pieces. Each alone gives a view of a previously unstudied part of the story. Together, they begin to satisfy questions unanswered and recount stories untold.

American Alchemy, by Brian Roberts, is subtitled The California Gold Rush and Middle-Class Culture. It could be more accurately be named The California Gold Rush and Northeastern, White, Male Middle-Class Culture, for this is its emphasis and the source of its strengths. Based on well-footnoted archival records of dozens of individuals, Roberts makes his most basic argument: "the gold rush was a rebellion against certain middle-class values; this revolt, in turn, was largely carried out by middle-class individuals" (p. 5). The individuals he cites were largely male (most left "their" womenfolk at home, bearing the double burden of hearth and commerce), and most were well heeled. In ten roughly chronological chapters, illustrated by a gallery of twelve pictures, Roberts's social history focuses on the groups that made the decision to come by sea or by the Isthmus of Panama rather than those who came overland. In lively prose, he contrasts the dream and the reality of California gold, the fate of the home folks, later developments in the mines, the decision to return home, and what it all meant.

Allegedly, the impetus that propelled this select group such a distance was self-loathing born of the conflict between traditional respectability and
growing industrial competition (p. 44). Eastern men overcame scruples about chasing filthy lucre (the root of all evil, not to mention lower-class vice and upper-class rigidity) and somehow found themselves in California. There, although many of them failed to get rich (certainly those studied here) they somehow proved their worth by avoiding temptation (i.e., they still lacked wealth) and returned prepared to accommodate the new industrial order with a greater moral flexibility. In short, if this white, male middle class could weather the temptations of the California Gold Rush, they were strong enough to stand firm (more or less) in the new, eastern industrial order.

One must get past Roberts’s flawed assertions that (1) no one else has noticed that the argonauts were largely middle class (start with Dame Shirley) and that (2) the women left at home have been ignored (see Linda Peavy and Ursula Smith, Women in Waiting in the Westward Movement: Life on the Home Frontier [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994]). His chapters on females are particularly weak. Chapter 7, “Widows and Helpmates,” ends largely in speculation, which could have been avoided had he read Peavy and Smith. In California, Roberts gives the reader “The Prude” (ch. 9) in which he makes Eliza Farnham (truly an exceptional individual) bear virtually the whole weight of respectable women in California. The contrast is badly overdrawn, and she, like lower-class men, ethnics, and southerners, are simply foils for Roberts’s favorite white, male northeastern subset of the middle class.

While the originality of this study has been inflated, it is still a significant book. Its greatest value lies in the perspective of the influence of the Gold Rush on northeastern males, rather than vice versa. Roberts places the whole California episode in a New England context, beginning with the Second Great Awakening and its “lowering of the Northeast’s threshold of shame” (p. 121). By the end of the book he has convinced his reader that the California Gold Rush, taking place as it did during America’s market revolution, helped create and/or solidify America’s modern middle class.

Susan Lee Johnson, by contrast, has concentrated on the polar opposite of Roberts’s work. Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush, she states, is a “book [which] openly yearns for social relations in which difference and domination are not so closely, so predictably, and so devastatingly linked to one another” (p. 19). This ideological yearning governs her search for and interpretation of evidence. Her subjects are carefully chosen: those populations which most openly rebelled against the white males from the East. As a result, she concentrates on Chilenos, Mexicans, Chinese, and Native Americans, largely slighting Hawaiians and African Americans (particularly women), and completely ignoring Jews. The dominators are monolithically Anglos, usually male, except when “respectable” white women show up. This approach allows Johnson to apply recently developed analyses of racial and gender relations, but belies the findings of Roberts’s careful study, which indicates that many of the oppressors failed and returned home, transformed and chastened.
Roaring Camp is organized thematically in six chapters subsumed under three sections: “Rush,” “Boom,” and “Bust,” illustrated by thirty well-spaced illustrations. The chapters are bracketed by a prologue and epilogue devoted to the deconstruction of myths and literary texts. A selected bibliography and index round out the work.

The great strength of Johnson’s book is its wide range of sources. She has concentrated on the less-studied southern mines, defined here as those sites in the Sierra from Amador through Mariposa counties, shown on maps on pages 23 and 24. Johnson has carefully read works from local historical societies, the Huntington Library, newspapers from the southern mines and from their predominant service town of Stockton. Her footnotes make copious reference not only to these primary and to secondary sources (particularly of social history) but to e-mails and scholarly conversations. Yet some references seem far from the subjects under study, such as Lila Abu-Lughod’s work on Bedouin women, used to analyze Joaquin Murrieta’s response to the rape of his wife (p. 349, n. 29). Her scope allows her, however, a global view: placing French emigration in the context of a national food shortage, describing Chinese privations that set their sons to overseas flight, for example (ch. 1).

Throughout, Johnson does a service by teasing out various stories of people other than white males from the eastern United States, who have heretofore been the major historical focus. However, when the facts are unknown or too sparse for her purposes, she fills in with speculation based on her predilections. For example, in discussing the battle between Chinese at Chinese Camp in Tuolumne County, the local newspaper reported that the sheriff’s horse was “shot out from under him by a random shot” (p. 306). On the following page, Johnson speculates: “One wonders, then, how random the shot was that killed the county sheriff’s horse . . . . Perhaps the blast was a brutal, eloquent rebuke to the dehumanizing gaze of the white miners” (p. 307). Or, perhaps not, since the Chinese typically armed themselves with pikes and axes, not guns.

Johnson should beware of reading either too much or too little into the plethora of evidence she has found. Another case in point: the baby down the mine. A female infant (suffocated) found in Murphy’s Flat in 1858 was thought by the examining doctor to have been the offspring of either two white parents or a white father and a Chilean mother (pp. 340-42). Johnson explores the imagined anguish of the posited Chilean woman, accepting the doctor’s terms. Johnson emphasizes the “depth of meaning in the woman’s gruesome decision to throw her infant daughter’s dead body down a shaft toward the Mother Lode, la veta madre” (p. 342). But what if the parents had been a white mother and a Chilean father? What would be the story then? It is a possibility she never considers, even after a preceding discussion of white women divorcing white men (pp. 284-89). In sum, Johnson’s book is entertaining reading laden with useful historical facts. Readers who do not share the author’s ideological persuasions will still find the book intriguing, but historians of different orien-
tations will do well to re-examine much of the data she presents.

While both the Roberts and the Johnson works add meaningfully to the literature on the California Gold Rush, they make lacunae in its study more obvious. Neither of these authors has addressed the ramifications of sectionalism (particularly North-South), surely one of the most potent forces in the mid-nineteenth century United States. Roberts occasionally denotes the lower class by sectional terms, especially “Pikes,” also known as “pukes” (found only once in the index, as “Missourian gold seekers,” [p. 325]). A particularly intriguing intersection of race and class is mentioned in passing by Roberts as he quotes Sarah Royce’s assessment of gold rush community members: together with the respectable there were a “motley assembly’ of Indians, Mexicans, and Chinese, along with forty-niners ‘of a different class’ [meaning lower]” (p. 256). Johnson, too, is aware of section, but only as a point of origin. In a few pages, she describes the decisions of southerners and northerners to make the trek to California (pp. 67-77). Once out west, however, her Anglos remain united by racial bonds, untouched by other differences. One wonders if lower-class whites indeed aligned with “ethnics” as Sarah Royce seemed to indicate, or were they more likely the agents of Anglo domination, brutalizing the locals of color when their self-conscious, moralizing, more upper-class brothers stood back? Did differences of North and South evaporate under California’s sun? What other subtleties have we been missing? While the books of both Roberts and Johnson help to lighten the gloom of earlier oversimplification, much still remains to be done.

Nancy J. Taniguchi
California State University, Stanislaus


In The Life and Legend of E. H. Harriman, Maury Klein has written an impressive book on one of the towering figures of American business history. Today Harriman might not have the same widespread name recognition as some of his robber-baron contemporaries like J.P. Morgan, but that does not diminish the astounding success, impact, and visibility Harriman had in business and finance around the turn of the twentieth century. Readers interested in the history of the American West should have a particular motivation to read this book because of Harriman’s ties to regional rail firms, especially the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads. In Klein’s hands, Harriman is more than simply a railroad man, and this book should have broad appeal.

Klein’s basic argument is that E. H. Harriman has gotten a bum rap from
historians. This is an angle to biography that Klein used in writing an earlier book that attempted to rehabilitate the reputation of another maligned businessman, Jay Gould. In *The Life and Legend of Jay Gould*, Klein focused on the nineteenth-century railroad and finance kingpin who was reviled by the public of the time and, because of his consistently unflattering portrayal by historians, now has a permanent seat at the robber-baron table. These two biographies by Klein might more appropriately be thought of as re-inventions rather than rehabilitations since Gould and Harriman have never been portrayed as anything but negative forces. The mirrored titles reflect Klein's mission in both books, which was to use materials not available to previous biographers to write more accurate histories.

Klein is largely successful in accomplishing his stated goal of squaring "the legend with the facts as we know them now" of E. H. Harriman (p. xvi). The author paints a picture of Harriman as a full character, with a family he dearly loved, and interests, such as nature, which he vigorously (and financially) supported. Klein does such a fine job of reanimating Harriman that after reading just a few hundred pages I felt almost as if I knew the old businessman. In fact, through the book's first 350 pages I wondered why Harriman had acquired his unattractive reputation. Only occasionally does Klein offer examples from Harriman's life that led him to be remembered as a mean-spirited, power-hungry megalomaniac. Most of those hints of Harriman's darker side come late in the book. For example, Klein characterizes Harriman's commandeering of a public boating event for his own convenience as "Harriman at his most imperious" (p. 406). In a more egregious example of his callousness, Klein mentions Harriman's order for workers to build a stretch of track so dangerous that, because of unstable soil, "men, mules, and beams [were hurled] out of the tunnel like toys" (p. 138). Ultimately the treacherous section was finished and Harriman cheered the completion of the project because "results mattered more to him than cost or even casualties" (p. 138). Klein's conclusions about Harriman like these seem few and far between, especially for a figure whose priorities put workers in harm's way just to maximize "results." Klein's book is no whitewash, but the author needed to be more critical of Harriman.

Readers of *The Life and Legend of E. H. Harriman* receive an unexpected bonus from Klein's ability to create characters when he turns his attention to describing some of Harriman's contemporaries. John Muir and Theodore Roosevelt, for example, have enjoyed considerable visibility and influence, so the reading public has formed impressions of them. Klein's writing skills make these characters lively and fascinating, allowing even ancillary figures help the reader understand what moved E. H. Harriman and the world in which he lived.

For historians and those interested in how history is written, *The Life and Legend of E. H. Harriman* is a treat. The reader cannot help but be impressed by Klein's diligent research, which is evident in the notes section. Klein sifted through mountains of personal papers and corporate collections, often from
far-flung and sometimes obscure repositories. This research is rounded out by a heavy use of contemporary periodicals, such as the *Wall Street Journal* and *Railroad Gazette*. Harriman’s life was closely intertwined with the press; it was both his scourge and a useful business tool, so references to him were common. Finding all of those references, however, must have been a gigantic task. Klein is clearly an expert on the railroad industry and its major figures, having written a substantial number of related articles, chapters, and books on the rail industry and its leaders. Klein’s references to Harriman’s earlier biographical treatments provide for greater appreciation of his book on the controversial businessman.

In terms of construction, the book is logical and useful. The story is easy to follow, and the use of twenty-nine chapters (plus an epilogue) does alert the reader to turning points and significance, but Klein would lose nothing in persuasiveness by using fewer chapters. Such a streamlined layout might, in fact, better focus attention on a few main themes. The book is well illustrated, having forty photos arranged next to the texts they highlight, as opposed to being grouped together. University of North Carolina Press has done a fine job assembling this text, which is typical for this publisher.

Maury Klein has written a book worthy of a large readership and high praise. Oftentimes figures like Harriman are saddled with legacies that are just shallow caricatures. Klein has certainly freed his subject of that fate with this book, although Harriman will never be lauded as one of America’s most benevolent employers.

Ric Dias

*Northern State University*

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“Wilderness” is as American as Coca-Cola and as an export even more contentious. Over the last few decades, traveling through the channels that earlier carried such ideas as “conservation,” “national parks,” and “wildlife preservation,” it went around the world, finding a decent market in countries like Australia (industrialized and dominated by Europeans) but a skeptical or even hostile reception elsewhere. In much of the developing world it appeared to be another piece of Western imperialism: Authorities removed poor people from lands they had traditionally used so that the rich could look at animals or scientists study them. The collision of American ideas and non-American realities spawned what the editors saw as a sterile debate pitting “nature” against people.
They sought to get beyond it by presenting the complexity of the problems involved in setting aside or even declaring areas of wilderness through a variety of voices, choosing pieces by full-time academics, people with academic connections, others working in environmental organizations or government agencies, and such occupational outliers as a free-lance journalist, an ethnobotanist, and a “community leader in Toroba, north of Tari on Papua New Guinea” (p. 221). The selections show clearly that American ideas did not always suit other cultures and that conditions and wilderness policies in the developing countries involve social and managerial questions as much as biological ones. They bring out—at times dramatically—the human dimensions of the issue. However, those already interested in this topic may already have read the issue of *Terra Nova* in which seven of these articles appeared and some of the seven books. Another piece came from a magazine and two others have no publication credit but are listed as reprints. On the other hand, those coming to the debate may be put off by the amount of material aimed at a particular audience (the issue of *Terra Nova* was to precede the Sixth World Wilderness conference), and they will need more than Rothenberg’s introduction to make sense of the debate (*The Great New Wilderness Debate* [Athens: University of Georgia, 1998] should help).

A useful perspective would be to see developments abroad in relation to the American situation. The developing countries now face the problems the founders of the Wilderness Society addressed in the 1930s: How to preserve wilderness and what place it should have in society. In the United States early wilderness advocates believed wilderness would survive only if people made a conscious choice to preserve it and took action, and that they would do this only if wilderness had some relation to their lives. Seventy years of economic development and population growth have made the questions more urgent abroad but not changed the essentials. These views stand behind the technical and legal discussions in *The World and the Wild*, and they form the cornerstone of the social ones. On the other hand, the world debate speaks to issues Americans have just begun to face—the problems of people in the wilderness and the adequacy of our ideas of wilderness. Early discussions in the United States ignored the native Americans, who had been removed to make the “wilderness” in the first place. That is no longer possible, and here we might learn from the developing countries, where indigenous peoples took center stage in the wilderness battles. The developing world’s widespread questioning of American categories should also interest those who have listened to the recent American debate over categories formed in Aldo Leopold’s time. This collection does not cohere, but it has lessons to teach, even for those who concern themselves only with wilderness and wilderness policy in the United States.

Thomas R. Dunlap
Texas A&M University
While a number of studies focused upon Las Vegas and its architecture have been published in the past, few authors have attempted to explore anything beyond the Las Vegas Strip. Julie Nicoletta, however, has undertaken a remarkable task: to document the architectural heritage of the state of Nevada. Her book, *Buildings of Nevada*, belongs to a series sponsored by the Society of Architectural Historians, titled *Buildings of the United States*, which aims to create a comprehensive history of architecture within their country. Nicoletta has contributed to this ambitious project by recording Nevada’s architectural points of interest as the state is undergoing considerable change—change that often threatens the very buildings and structures that the book seeks to document.

The book is arranged in an easy-to-use and utilitarian format: It opens with an introduction that provides a cultural and historical background to the development of Nevada’s built environments; this is followed by sections devoted to five regional divisions (northwestern, northern, central, southern-central, and southern) that take the reader on a journey through the state.

The introduction is noteworthy as it provides a concise overview of the state’s history, geography, and cultural development, including accounts detailing the impacts that mining, railroads, the federal government, and tourism have had upon Nevada since the 1800s. For those unfamiliar with the history of Nevada, this introduction will prove quite interesting. In addition, Nicoletta’s accounts of the development of both the architectural and the preservation communities in the state are significant, if brief, contributions, given that little has been written elsewhere on this subject.

However, it is important to point out that *Buildings of Nevada* is not an architectural history. Nicoletta’s book, rather, is a point-by-point catalog of a wide range of building types and architectural landscapes. This is not so much a criticism as it is a point of clarification. *Buildings of Nevada* provides its readers with a fairly comprehensive overview of buildings and places within the state and, in this sense, the book succeeds. However, the guidebook format does have its limits. For example, this framework works well with the scale of many of Nevada’s smaller towns and cities but it fails to adequately cover the Las Vegas metropolitan area. Towns such as Elko and Winnemucca are well represented; however, given the scale of the Las Vegas metropolitan area, Nicoletta seems forced to confine her discussion of that city to the downtown, the historic district, and the resort corridor surrounding Las Vegas Boulevard. While Nicoletta does identify several interesting sites, ranging from the Las Vegas Academy of International Studies and Performing Arts to a Spanish colonial revival duplex, Summerlin, the master-planned community to the northwest, is overlooked in this account. This exclusion is puzzling given that Summerlin represents a form of boom-period housing development first mentioned in the book’s own introduction. In addition, two of Las Vegas’s more interesting
residential projects, one by California architect Mark Mack and another by local architect Eric Strain, do not fall within the geographic limits outlined by the author. These projects, one internationally acclaimed and the other a regional award winner, would add to the breadth of the work’s documented by Nicoletta’s book and help to illustrate the growing sophistication of the architectural climate in Las Vegas.

Despite these limitations, *Buildings of Nevada* marks an important point in the development of Nevada—the moment when the need to locate the past begins to balance the persistent need to build a future. Unlike California or the many states along the eastern seaboard, Nevada does not have a depth of traditionally recognizable architecturally significant sites. But Nicoletta has done an excellent job of illustrating the state’s wealth of built artifacts and their importance to the historical development of Nevada. By including structures such as jails and bunkhouses alongside various government buildings and monuments to tourism, Nicoletta has provided an unbiased account of Nevada’s architectural landscape. In this sense, *Buildings of Nevada* does not openly pursue any agenda; the book is not a diatribe on the need to preserve the materials it has cataloged. This may be, for some, a missed opportunity. Nevada exhibits a penchant for wiping the slate clean in the name of impending development, and the architectural and preservation communities in Nevada could have benefited from the support of Nicoletta and her work. None the less, the author’s broad approach to architecturally significant sites and buildings is refreshing and often surprising. In this sense, *Buildings of Nevada* provides a welcome account of the state’s architectural heritage. This book is arguably the most comprehensive compilation of Nevada’s architectural artifacts and, given its guidebook format, will serve as a primary resource for scholars, students, and the general public alike.

José L. Gamez  
*University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

*Understanding the Arizona Constitution.* By Toni McClory (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001)

As the author of a similar work on the history, politics, government, and constitution of Nevada, this reviewer was particularly intrigued to read what Toni McClory had to say about the same topics in Arizona. McClory is well suited to write this book given her service as an assistant attorney general in Arizona and her current position teaching political science at Glendale Community College. Her qualifications and skills in research and writing clearly show here as she has published an outstanding work that should be
useful to a wide variety of audiences, including students, concerned citizens, and professionals.

There is much to commend this book to the general reader and the serious student of politics alike. The work is organized in the traditional way that volumes of this type tend to be, with chapters on the state’s history, the constitution, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, direct democracy, and local government, although for an attorney/author, there is an inexplicable absence of a separate chapter on civil rights and civil liberties. Also, quite traditionally, the author describes both the history of the state and more current political and constitutional controversies and issues.

What is not traditional about this book is two-fold. First, McClory provides at the end of each chapter a set of on-line resources for each of the topics (e.g., Web sites where one can find the United States and Arizona constitutions, Arizona Revised Statutes, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and so forth) so that those who are interested may consult the primary sources directly. Second, she not only describes the government and politics of the Grand Canyon State, she also goes to great lengths to explain why these structures or practices exist as they do. As but one example, the author notes in her preface, “To me, the interesting issue isn’t that Arizona has a part-time legislature, but why this is so, and what advantages and disadvantages flow from this arrangement” (p. xii). And, the promise is carried through when, in the chapter on the legislature, McClory discusses these issues with great insight, diligence, and care. That practice is repeated with any number of other topics discussed in the book.

The development of Arizona from an area inhabited by native Americans and little else into a fast-growing, populated, modern state is incredibly similar to that of Nevada. With the exception of the region around Tucson, which would later become the Gadsden Purchase, Arizona, like Nevada, was ceded to the United States by the Mexicans in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; the Compromise of 1850 included it within another territory, New Mexico, just as Nevada had been included in Utah; the area was initially seen as little more than a barren obstacle to those seeking their fortunes in California; and, like Nevadans, the territorial inhabitants were victims of a lack of law and order who chafed at the long distance to the territorial capital in Santa Fe and who from at least 1856 demanded, unsuccessfully at first, separate territorial status. Also, similar to Nevada, the legislature was regularly (and cheaply) bribed by mining and railroad interests and the early judges brought the territory into disrepute because of economic conflicts of interest involving those whose cases they heard.

At the same time, there are, as one might expect, significant differences between Arizona and the Silver State. Unlike “Battle Born” and “All for Our Country” Nevada, Arizonans sympathized with the Confederates during the Civil War and one battle was even fought there. Also, very much unlike Nevada, Arizona was a territory for forty-nine years before it became a state in
1912, the last of the forty-eight contiguous states to do so; Nevada, in contrast, was a territory for only three years prior to obtaining statehood, the fastest transition of any of the western states.

It is, perhaps, the parallels between the two states that are most salient, however, given that they have structured their constitutions and governments in similar ways. For example, a fear of career politicians led both states from the outset to adopt part-time citizen legislatures and, later, term limits on officeholders. The concern that too much power might be concentrated in the hands of the governor led both states to adopt a plural executive. And, as noted earlier, both states have all three forms of direct democracy elections: initiative, referendum, and recall, with the difference being that these were included in Arizona’s original Progressive Era constitution while Nevadans amended their 1864 constitution during this period to include them.

McClory discusses Arizona’s development and its current government structures in a concise and highly readable way. Most important, she is quite deft in her ability to relate and to explain current issues in state government in light of historical, economic, political, and cultural factors. She is obviously well versed in her topic and is more than able to relate this information so that it is easily understood. One imagines that this work will be utilized in required university and community college courses on the Arizona Constitution; it should be highly successful.

At the same time, however, it is worth noting some minor shortcomings of the work so that they will, perhaps, be remedied in a second edition. Although the book points readers to an on-line source for the state constitution, this reviewer would have preferred to see a copy in the book’s appendix. This inclusion would provide an important pedagogical tool in that students could be directed to specific passages of the constitution as they relate to topics being discussed in class. Second, the book abruptly and unsatisfyingly ends with its chapter on local government. A conclusion tying together the various individual chapters would have helped the reader to relate the mass of information provided throughout the book’s seven chapters in a contextual way.

Nonetheless, these are minor shortcomings and over-all the book is an enjoyable and informative read that is recommended to anyone with an interest in Arizona history, politics, and government or an interest in comparative state and local politics, constitutions, and governments.

Michael W. Bowers
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Chinese on the American Frontier is part of Arif Dirlik’s Pacific Formations: Global Relations in Asian and Pacific Perspectives series. In this particular volume, Dirlik collected twenty-nine primary and secondary selections about the Chinese experience in the non-California nineteenth-century American West. Dirlik sought to bring together a “significant body of literature” (p. xii) about the Chinese in the West that would provide a teaching tool for those offering courses in the history of the American West and in Asian-American studies. In his introductory essay, Dirlik discusses five issues that he believes permeate the essays in the collection. They include the rearrangement of frontier coastal patterns, Chinese-Anglo social relations in the West, the dynamics of frontier Chinatowns, interethnic relations, and the oppression, resistance, and violence against the Chinese.

The selections provide a student or researcher an excellent background in the literature of the Chinese in the West. Three of the selections are primary material and include Mark Twain’s chapter from Roughing It about the Chinese in Virginia City, Nevada. The majority of the remaining articles were originally published in western state historical journals, collections of essays, or as parts of master’s theses. Although the quality of the essays varies author to author, these pieces were often among the first items written about the Chinese in any single region. Three excellent places to start researching the Chinese experience are in Dirlik’s collection, including Russell M. Magnaghi’s “Virginia City’s Chinese Community, 1860-1880” (1981), “The Chinese in Texas” (1977) by Edward J. M.Rhoads, and “Pioneer Chinese of Utah” (1970) by Don C. Conley. These three articles provide detailed information about the number of Chinese living in the western communities, as well as their lifestyles. These early writings do not attempt to put the Chinese into national perspective, but give a good starting place for anyone researching the Chinese experience.

In “Territory of New Mexico v. Yee Shun (1882): A Turning Point in Chinese Legal Relationships in the Trans-Mississippi West” (1990), John Wunder looks at how the Chinese attempted to win the right to testify in court, bringing new light to the importance of the Chinese on the issue of civil rights. On a different level, Sister M. Alfreda Elsensohn’s “Polly Bemis, Legendary Heroine” (1970) lacks documentary evidence and provides a romantic and stereotypical explanation of the life of a Chinese woman in Idaho. Unfortunately, only four of Dirlik’s selections were published in the 1990s, while nine appeared in the 1980s, seven in the 1970s, five in the 1960s, and one in the 1950s. Since 1996, the date of his most recent selection, dozens of articles about the Chinese have been published in state and regional historical journals, many of them explaining the Chinese experience in light of national events. The modern literature goes
well beyond the detailed descriptions that some of the earlier articles provided. Although the older essays cannot be ignored, inclusion of more recent works would have added considerable value to the collection, as well as shown how the literature has changed over the years. An extensive bibliography is provided, including a list of Ph.D. and M.A. theses about the Chinese experience, but it does not list anything newer than 1991.

Dirlik wanted to provide a comprehensive overview of the Chinese experience in the non-California West that would increase our knowledge of the Chinese presence there. He accomplished that; however, a second volume with more up-to-date selections is desirable. Dirlik’s use of the term *frontier* might be adjusted to *West* keeping in line with the latest historiography. On a minor note, several of the bibliographical citations contain errors that might lead students astray in their search for the cited works. The collection also includes numerous maps, charts, photographs, and tables that were put together by Malcolm Yeung, a graduate student at the University of Colorado, Boulder. On the whole, the book is a good collection of basic essays about the Chinese experience and libraries should consider purchasing it, especially if they do not have subscriptions to numerous state and local history journals.

Diana L. Ahmad  
*University of Missouri - Rolla*
The Nevada Historical Society
is proud to present

The Nevada Quilt Odyssey
The Third Part of A Quilt Exhibit in Three Parts

July 2002 through September 2002

Part III:
The Future
Art Quilts From the Creative Quilters
July 12 - September 28, 2002

Family Fun Day at the Nevada Historical Society
Saturday, July 13, 2002
1:00 - 3:00 pm

Celebrate the opening of The Future; enjoy free ice cream cookies, and lemonade; hands-on quilt activities for the kids.

20% discount in the Museum Store, book signings by local authors, and the music of the Rubber Chicken String Band.
Admission is free.

Quilt made by Carolyn Susac.

This exhibition supported, in part, by the Nevada Humanities Committee and the Nevada Historical Society Docent Council.
The Nevada Historical Society Docent Council

is pleased to announce the establishment of an

annual scholarship/stipend

to any graduate student working on

an aspect of Nevada history,

at a University of Nevada campus,

for the purpose of attending a

professional seminar to present a paper.

The amount of the scholarship for the 2002 year

will be $300.00.

Completed applications must be returned to

the Nevada Historical Society Docent Council

by June 1, 2002

for consideration of funds to be awarded

in September, 2002.

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FOR MORE INFORMATION CHECK THE NEVADA HISTORICAL SOCIETY
WEBSITE AT NEVADACULTURE.ORG
OR CALL 775-688-1190 EXT. 223
Due to extreme revenue shortfalls, the Nevada Historical Society regretfully announces the cancellation of the seventh Biennial Conference on Nevada History.

We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.
Nevada Historical Society Membership Information

Memberships help support the costs of special exhibitions, educational projects, and the publication of the Nevada Historical Society Quarterly. With your assistance we can continue the excellent work that the community and our visitors expect.

Benefits:
Nevada Historical Society Quarterly.
Free admission to the museum.
Free admission to the Division of Museums and History museums.
10% discount at NHS and divisional gift shops.
10% discount on the purchase of photographs.
10% discount on tours to historic sites.
Special invitations to openings and events.
Advance sales of occasional publications.

My check for membership is enclosed for:

___ Regular $25
___ Family $35
___ Student $15
___ Senior $15 (60 and over-no Quarterly)
___ Sustaining $50
___ Contributing $100
___ Departmental Fellow $250 (receives publications of all divisional museums)
___ Patron $500
___ Benefactor $1000
___ Life $2500

Corporate
___ Regular $250
___ Contributing $500

Contact the Nevada Historical Society at 775 688-1191 for more information.
Founded in 1904, the Nevada Historical Society seeks to advance the study of the heritage of Nevada. The Society publishes scholarly studies, indexes, guidebooks, bibliographies, and the *Nevada Historical Society Quarterly*; it collects manuscripts, rare books, artifacts, historical photographs and maps, and makes its collections available for research; it maintains a museum at its Reno facility; and it is engaged in the development and publication of educational materials for use in the public schools.